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Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (U.S. 1968)
Petitioners Joseph Jones and his wife filed a complaint in the District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri alleging that respondent housing developer, Alfred H. Mayer Co., refused to sell them a home in a
residential development solely because petitioner Jones was a Negro.
Petitioners sought injunctive and other relief,' relying in part on title 42,
section 1982 of the United States Code which provides that:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,2
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
The district court sustained respondent's motion to dismiss concluding
that section 1982 applies only to refusals to sell where some governmental
or "state action" is involved and not to similar refusals by private individuals3 and, on the same basis, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed. 4 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that section 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as
public, in the sale or rental of property, and that so construed the statute
is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the thirteenth amendment. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
The Civil War and its aftermath, brought about significant changes
in the area of civil rights since the victory of the northern armies marked
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1964)

permits a district court to award "damages

or . . . equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protec"
tion of civil rights ....
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
3. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
4. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967). The Eighth
Circuit did, however, note three rationales which the Supreme Court could adopt in
order to permit a cause of action in a similar case:
It would not be too surprising if the Supreme Court one day were to hold
that a court errs when it dismisses a complaint of this kind. It could do so by
asserting that § 1982 was, because of its derivation from the Thirteenth Amendment, free of the shackles of state action ....
It could do so by asserting that,
even though § 1982, because of its reenactment, was subject to Fourteenth Amendment limitations, we nevertheless have, on the accepted facts here, enough to constitute state action in the light of the expanding concept of that term. And it could
do so on the ground . . . that state action is no longer a factor of limitation and
that Congress has acted through § 1982 to reach private discrimination in housing.
Id. at 44-45.

(116)
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the demise of slavery as a legalized institution. 5 In 1865 the thirteenth
amendment became effective, providing in section 1 that "[n] either slavery
nor involuntary servitude . . shall exist within the United States . .. ."
Under section 2 of the amendment Congress was given the power to enforce
the abolition of slavery by appropriate legislation 7 In the next year
Congress exercised this power in passing the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 8 and in United States v. Harris,9 the Supreme Court noted that
what is now section 1982 was enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment.10 One year later in the Civil Rights Cases," the Court, although not
specifically concerned with section 1982, stated that the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, even as reenacted in 1870, was "clearly corrective in its character,
intended to counteract and furnish redress against State laws and proceedings, and customs having the force of law, which sanction the wrongful
12
acts specified.'
Thus, from the first judicial interpretation of the Act in the
Civil Rights Cases it appeared that some governmental or state action
was a necessary element in the application of section 1982. This position
was reinforced in Buchanan v. WarleyI3 when the Supreme Court interpreted section 1982 as requiring proof of state action. In effect, the Court
was applying the standards of the fourteenth amendment,' 4 which had
already been clothed with a state action requirement, 15 rather than those of
the thirteenth amendment, which was recognized to have application to in7
dividual actions.' 6 A similar view was expressed in Hurd v. Hodge'

5. See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 MICH. L. Rgv. 1323 (1952).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.

8. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §§ 1, 2, 14 Stat. 27. Section 1 of this Act
is the predecessor of 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Section 2 of the Act provides for criminal
punishment of any person who deprives another of any right secured or protected by
the Act, when accomplished "under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
or custom .......
These sections were reenacted 2 years after ratification of the
fourteenth amendment in the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144.
9. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
10. Id. at 640.
11. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
12. Id. at 16. But cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967),
where the court stated that:
[T]he reasoning of the Civil Rights Cases is in the process of reevaluation,
if not overruling, and . . . a court may not need to stretch to find state action if
appropriate congressional legislation is present.

Id. at 42.
13. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
14. Section 1 provides in part: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis
added). Section 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation the provisions of this article." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5. The state
action requirement has evolved from the wording of the amendment - "No State
shall . . . deny . .. ."
15. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883).
16. Id. at 20.
17. 334 U.S. 24 (1948). In Hurd state action was found in the plaintiff's use of
a federal court in attempting to enforce an agreement between white, private individuals to keep Negroes out of a residential area.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/7
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which, in dictum, interpreted Corrigan v. Buckley 18 to mean that section
1982 only applies to state action. Corriganheld, however, only that private
individuals were permitted to contract with one another to control the
disposition of their property, 19 but did not resolve the issue of whether section 1982 prohibits an actual refusal to sell to a Negro by private parties. 20
Against this background of dicta imposing a requirement that a plaintiff prove state action in cases in which racial discrimination was alleged
under section 1982, the instant case squarely confronted the Supreme Court,
for the first time, with the issues of whether section 1982 prohibits purely
private discrimniation on the basis of race in the sale or rental of property
and whether Congress in the first instance properly had the power to enact
that section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, concluded from a study
of the congressional debates preceding the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
from the structure and language of the Act itself that section 1 of the Act,
from which section 1982 was evolved, was intended to be applicable to
private as well as to governmental action. 21 In the Civil Rights Cases it
was recognized that Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to
further the objectives of the thirteenth amendment to destroy the "badges
and incidents of slavery"2 2 and to secure the fundamental rights which
comprise civil freedom -

"the same right . ..to inherit, purchase, lease,

sell, and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens. '2a It was additionally stated that legislation under the thirteenth amendment "may be
direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or not . . .- 24 Thus, the fact that the Court
18. 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
19. Id. at 331.
20. One other federal court faced this issue and held that a wholly private conspiracy of white citizens to prevent a Negro from leasing a farm violated section 1982.
United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903).
21. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420-36 (1968). In analyzing
the structure and language of the Act the Court stated:
[I]f § 1 had been intended to grant nothing more than an immunity from
governmental interference, then much of § 2 would have made no sense at all.
For that section, which provided fines and prison terms for certain individuals
who deprived others of rights "secured or protected" by § 1, was carefully drafted
to exempt private violations of § 1 from the criminal sanctions it imposed. There
would ...have been no private violations to exempt if the only "right" granted
by § 1 had been a right to be free of discrimination by public officials. Hence
the structure of the 1866 Act, as well as its language, points to the conclusion ...
that § 1 was meant to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations of the rights
enumerated in the statute, although only those deprivations perpetrated "under
color of law" were to be criminally punishable under § 2.
Id. at 424-26. See also Robison, The Possibility of a Frontal Assault on the State
Action Concept, With Special Reference to the Right to Purchase Real Property
Guaranteed in 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 41 No~rRs DAMS LAw. 455, 465 (1966).
22. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
23. Id. at 22. See also Robison, supra note 21, at 465 where it was stated:
[Ilt is inappropriate to apply to language formulated in 1866, the concept of state
action which came into the law seventeen years later .... It is not unreasonable
to conclude that the Congress . . .intended, in the first Civil Rights Act, to reach
individual conduct as well as state action that effectively impaired the right to
purchase property.
24. 109 U.S. at 23. See also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 641 (1883),
where
concept
is also Charles
recognized.
Published bythis
Villanova
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viewed section 1982 as applicable to the actions of private individuals
25
presented no constitutional problem.
The majority then turned to the remaining issue:
[Whether] Congress has power under the Thirteenth Amendment to
eradicate conditions that prevent Negroes from buying and renting
property because of their race or color ....

26

If this issue was resolved in the affirmative then no federal statute calculated to achieve that objective could be said to exceed the constitutional
power of Congress because it goes beyond state action to regulate the
conduct of private individuals. The Court concluded that Congress had
such power by virtue of the enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment
which provided Congress with the power to pass appropriate legislation
to enforce the ultimate end of abolishing slavery in the United States. 27
This power of Congress was recognized as early as the Civil Rights Cases
in which it was explicitly noted that the disability to hold property was an
incident of slavery.28 Finally, the Court determined that the Congress in
1866 had not acted irrationally 29 in deciding what constituted the "badges
and incidents of slavery," and that section 1982 was indeed intended to
rectify the injustices related to those incidents. 30
Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom Mr. Justice White concurred, argued
in his dissenting opinion that the existing precedents were contrary to the
Court's view of the statute.3 1 In addition, it was noted that section 2 of
the Act which provided criminal penalties against any person who deprived
another under color of law, statute, ordinance, or regulation, or custom, of
any rights secured by the Act, was equally open to the interpretation that
25. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968). The Court is
pointing out that if the legislation was validly enacted under the thirteenth amendment,
then the fact that section 1982 applies to individual action is not a constitutional
problem.
26. Id. at 438.
27. See United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903), where the court
stated :
[C]ongress has the power, under the provisions of the thirteenth amendment, to
protect citizens of the United States in the enjoyment of those rights which are
fundamental and belong to every citizen, if the deprivation of these privileges is
solely on account of his race or color, as a denial of such privileges is an element
of servitude within the meaning of that amendment.
Id. at 330.
28. 109 U.S. at 22. Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the majority, did not discuss
the constitutional validity of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 under the thirteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Harlan in dissent, however, expressed no doubt as to its validity.
29. The Court's concern for the rationality of Congress is not new. It was
recognized in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), where the
Court stated:
[W]e think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national
legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it
confers are to be carried into execution . . . to perform . . . duties . . . in the

manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.
Id. at 421.
30. Robison, supra note 21, at 466, makes a similar argument.
31. See pp. 117-18 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/7
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it was carefully drafted to enforce rights secured by section 1 among which
2
were the rights to inherit, purchase, and lease real and personal property.3
The basis for this contention was the fact that Mr. Justice Harlan interpreted the term "right" as it appears in the Act in a different manner than
did the majority. Mr. Justice Harlan felt that the "right" referred to was
the right to equal status under the law - the right of equal protection as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment - in which case the statute would
operate only against state-sanctioned discrimination. The majority, on the
other hand, felt that the "right" was absolute and thus enforceable through
the thirteenth amendment against private individuals.3 3 Thus, after his own
exhaustive study of the legislative debate preceding the Act, Mr. Justice
Harlan concluded that the interpretation employed by the majority was
subject to considerable doubt if not entirely untenable.34 In conjunction
with this, it is important to note that Mr. Justice Harlan was careful in
supporting his argument to choose those portions of the original congressional debates which made reference to state laws and customs having
the force of law.8 5
The contention that section 1982 requires proof of state action has
validity, especially when placed in historical context. The dissent was
cognizant of the fact that the Act was passed at a time when there was
a highly individualistic, laissez-faire spirit permeating American life, and
when state "fair housing" laws were nonexistent.36 In light of this, it is
extremely pertinent in analyzing the intended scope of the Act to point out
37
of
that at the time the Act was passed there was a paucity of criticism

its ramifications in the area of private discrimination in housing. It is
therefore not unreasonable to conclude that the Act was not originally
intended to reach as far as the instant decision has extended it.38
The ramifications of the instant decision, especially in its application
to the area of fair housing, are extremely important. This is particularly
true since the instant case was decided just 2 months after Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 196839 which contains extensive fair housing provisions under Title VIII. 40 The Court stated, however, that section 1982
32. See note 21 supra for the majority's interpretation of sections 1 and 2.
33. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 452-54 (1968).
34. Id. at 473.
35. See, e.g., CONG. GLOB, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866) (remarks of Senator
Trumbull) ; id. at 1118-19 (remarks of Representative Wilson).
36. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 473-75 (1968).
37. Id. at 475.
38. The dissent also argued on the basis of Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1
(1906), that there is doubt as to the scope of the thirteenth amendment. It was argued
that Hodges limited the scope of the thirteenth amendment to apply solely to individual
conduct which actually enslaves another; however, the majority explicitly overruled
Hodges insofar as it was inconsistent with their views in the instant case.
39. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).
40. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, § 804(a) (discrimination on grounds of religion and national origin) ; § 804(b) (discrimination in providing services or facilities dealing with the sale or rental of a dwelling) ; § 804(c),
(d), (e) (discrimination in advertising or other representations) ; § 805 (discrimination in financing) ; § 806 (discrimination in brokerage services).
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is not a comprehensive open housing law .4 1 This contention is true to
some degree, for if the Court had chosen to reach its conclusion by entirely eliminating the state action concept as it applies through the fourteenth amendment, the result would have been an open housing law of far
greater magnitude than is provided for in the 1968 Act 4 2 and to that
extent its decision would have nullified the intent and effects of that Act
43
Petiand converted the Supreme Court into a quasi-legislative body.
tioners argued that state action was present in the activities of the respondent housing developer since such activities were sanctioned by state
zoning and licensing measures. 44 Although the concept of state action
seems to be undergoing judicial reevaluation 45 housing developments, even
of large sizes, have generally not been labeled as having governmental
attributes.4 0 In light of this, it would have been difficult for the petitioner
in the instant case to show the existence of state action in respondent's
activities. However, since the Court concluded that the racial discrimination
in the instant case violated a federal statute enacted within the power of
Congress, they found it unnecessary to consider whether such discrimination
47
also violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Petitioners also contended that the state action concept should not be
applicable to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment which grants Congress the power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" of
49
the amendment. 48 In view of United States v. Guest in which six concurring Justices reasoned that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment
0
empowers Congress to proscribe purely private conduct, this argument
might have served as a basis of decision for the Court in Jones. The
utilization of this theory would not necessarily have resulted in an effect
as sweeping as the complete elimination of the state action concept because,
as one commentator has observed, the state action curb could be retained
with respect to section 1 of the fourteenth amendment and abandoned as
41. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
42. Robison, supra note 21, at 462, points out that "[iJf the courts were to hold
that section 1 [of the fourteenth amendment], by itself, prohibits racial discrimination,
they would either have to apply that holding to all forms of discrimination or devise
some limitation on its scope."
43. See A. Cox, M. Hown, & J. WIGGINS, CIVIL RIGHTS, TH4 CONSTITUTION,
AND TH4 COURTS 30, 53 (1967), where Professor Howe notes in discussing the history
of civil rights that if the courts had given sweeping effect to the fourteenth amendment
in order to protect the lives, liberties, properties, and equalities of all persons against
private injury, this would have extended the power of Congress under the thirteenth
amendment even further than anticipated by the abolitionists.
44. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 39-55, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
45. See 13 VILL. L. Riv. 199, 201 (1967).
46. St. Antoine, Color Blindness but Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action,
Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination,59 MIcH. L. Riv. 993, 1007
(1961).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 23-39, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
49. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
50. Id. at 761.
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to section 5. This approach would allow Congress to decide the scope of a
ban on racial bias extending beyond the traditional state action boundaries. 51
The Court attempted to narrow the application of the instant case by
distinguishing section 1982 from the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The former,
the Court noted, is a general statute of limited application - applicable
only to racial discrimination in the rental and sale of property and enforceable only through the individual initiative of private litigants. The latter statute, under the provisions contained in Title VIII, is a comprehensive
and detailed housing law covering a broader range of discriminatory practices 52 and is enforceable through diverse methods of federal assistance.53
The dissent, on the other hand, took exception to the Court's efforts
to distinguish the two laws and to show that they can exist independently
of one another. Mr. Justice Harlan reasoned that the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 presented "one of those rare instances in which an event
which occurs after the hearing of argument so diminishes a case's public
significance . . . as to justify this Court in dismissing the writ as im-

providently granted." 54 In effect, Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the
Court in its construction of section 1982 extended the coverage of federal
fair housing laws to a point beyond which Congress intended in enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 55 This contention seems to be valid in that,
at least where the sale or rental of real and personal property is involved,
purely private discrimination because of race or color is now forbidden
without the exceptions provided for in the 1968 Act. 56 One such exception
is the sale or rental of a single-family house by a private owner provided
he does not own more than three such houses at one time, and provided
that he does not inhabit the dwelling. It is further provided that after
December 31, 1969, this exception will apply only where a dwelling is
sold or rented without the services of a broker, agent, or salesman and
without the use of discriminatory advertising.5 7 Another exception in
the 1968 Act is the rental of rooms in dwellings with living quarters
accommodating no more than four families, where the owner himself
lives on the premises. 58 In light of the instant case, it appears that a remedy
will now be available in these circumstances through a private suit under
section 1982.
51. Robinson, supra note 21, at 463. See also Gressman, supra note 5, at 1329-33,

1340, where the author discusses the application of the fourteenth amendment to viola-

tions by individuals, and Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in "Private"Housing, 52 CALIf. L. Rxv. 1 (1964), where an argument for
the virtual dilution of the state action requirement is presented.
52. For a more detailed discussion of the differences see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413-14 (1968).
53. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, §§ 808-11 (assistance through the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development);
§ 813 (a) (intervention by the Attorney General).
54. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 477 (1968).
55. Id. at 478.
56. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 803(b), 807, 82 Stat.
73, 82-83, 84.
57. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 803(h) (1), 82 Stat. 73, 82.
58. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 803 (b) (2), 82 Stat. 73, 83.
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One commentator59 has suggested a liberal approach to state action
under the fourteenth amendment under which state action could be classified
as being constitutional or unconstitutional, depending on the degree of impairment of a given individual's rights in a particular factual situation. For
example, if an owner of a small apartment house were privileged under
state law to refuse to rent to a Negro, this would probably be constitutional
state action because the discriminatory effect would be slight. But if this
individual owned many large apartment houses and there were a housing
shortage, then unconstitutional state action might be found. Even if the
Court chose to use such an approach, it would be difficult to find that racial
discrimination by an owner of one private dwelling would be unconstitutional state action since the effect of one owner's discrimination on the
Negro's opportunity to purchase other housing and to use other land without encountering further racial discrimination would be slight.60
Although the effects of the liberal interpretation of section 1982 in
the principal case appear to be widespread, there are at least two factors
which may serve to constrain its operation. Initially, it is arguable that
section 1982 is limited in its application to infringement of only fundamental or natural rights basically encompassing, as was suggested in
United States v. Morris,6' the rights to hold and dispose of both real and
personal property and to work for a living. Under this theory these fundamental rights are considered to be general rather than specific in nature;
hence they would include "the right to buy or lease a home but not necessarily the right to deal in a particular store." 62 Secondly, the nature of
relief available under section 1982 is still subject to question. Whereas the
1968 Act contains a provision which allows a court to award actual as well
as punitive damages, 63 the Court in the instant case did not specifically
decide whether the right to such recovery may be implied in a given cir4
it was recogcumstance under section 1982. However, in Bell v. HoodU
nized that "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."6' 5 It may therefore be presumed that if a plaintiff could show that he had suffered some uncompensated pecuniary injury - which petitioners in the instant case did not
show - it would be within the province of the court to award such
damages. As was previously noted, 66 if the Court had entirely eliminated
the state action requirement, it would have nullified Congress' judgment
59. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. RZv. 208 (1957).
60. Id. at 213.
61. 125 F. 322, 326 (E.D. Ark. 1903). See note 16 supra. See also Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), where it is noted that the rights to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, and convey property are the fundamental rights which comprise civil freedom.
Id. at 22.
62. Robison, supra note 21, at 466.
63. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 812(c), 82 Stat. 73, 88.
64. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
65. Id. at 684 (footnote omitted).
66. See p. 121 supra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/7
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to provide exceptions to the Civil Rights Act of 1968. If the Court were
to award damages or fashion other types of judicial relief (for example,
relief fashioned after the remedies authorized by the 1968 Act) in actions
brought under section 1982 they would be encroaching upon an area of
congressional discretion. By fashioning such remedies in cases which would
not be justiciable due to the exceptions provided in the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, the Court could effectively nullify the intent of Congress in that
sphere by a form of judicial legislation.
One practical problem for a plaintiff who relies either on section 1982
or the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is that of proof. The plaintiff has the
burden of proving that he was discriminated against solely for racial reasons, 67 and meeting this burden of proof will be a difficult task, especially
where sale or rental is refused by an individual homeowner who may have
a variety of excuses for refusing to sell or rent, for example, he was waiting
to see more prospects or decided not to sell at this time or the price
offered was too low. With respect to large housing developers it might be
valuable from an evidentiary point of view to examine the seller's records
of prospective buyers to determine how many possible sales were not
pursued or were wholly ignored.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the application of section 1982
will be upon the social habits and customs of individual property owners.
Property rights have throughout history been accorded an almost sacred
position in the law, and it has been suggested that under the justification
of protecting private property rights, one should not be required to sell,
08
One
rent, or lease his property to any person if he does not so desire.
commentator, although specifically concerned with community planning, has
made a pertinent observation concerning an individual's relationship to his
land. It was stated that the common person is very conservative about
changes in the land, for he is affected by such changes in many habits and
sentiments. In addition, a community plan involves a choice of living
standards, attitudes, schedule, and personal and cultural tone. Such social
habits and customs are not easy to change.6 9 In fact, one advocate of inviolate property rights has explicitly stated that "[n]o decision of the
Supreme Court is going to make these changes in the social customs and
personal habits of millions of individuals, nor will any act of Congress
make them."70 This statement, however, fails to recognize the directive
nature and educational effect of opinions rendered by the Supreme Court
71
in the area of civil rights. A case such as Brown v. Board of Education,
which judicially eliminated school segregation, certainly can be said to
have had a great educational impact in effecting changes in the customs
and habits of individuals. Both the instant decision and the Civil Rights
67. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810(e), 82 Stat. 73, 86, for
example, places the burden of such proof on the plaintiff.
68. Sparkman, Civil Rights and Property Rights, 24 FMn. B.J. 31, 39 (1964).
69. PAUL GOODATAN & PERCIVAL GOODMAN, COMMUNITAS 9, 10 (2d ed. 1960).

70. Sparkman, sitpra note 68, at 32.

483 (1954).
347 U.S.
Published 71.
by Villanova
University
Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1968], Art. 7
FALL

1968]

RECENT

DEVELOPMENTS

Act of 1968 are also likely to have a great directive effect on social mores
and customs.
In conclusion, although the Civil Rights Act of 1968 will apply to
some areas heretofore not imbued with state action, the bulk of its protec72
tion is afforded in areas where the courts have already found state action.
Despite the possible problems which may arise in proving discrimination,
the Court in the instant decision has given the victims of discrimination
recourse to a method of judicial prohibition of private racial discrimination
in the sale or rental of real and personal property without the previously
concomitant requirement of establishing state action and without the
73
exceptions provided for in the 1968 Civil Rights Act.
Steven G. Brown
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PENALTY HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS.

Witherspoon v. Illinois (U.S. 1968)
Petitioner was tried for murder in 1960 by the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, and the jury found him guilty, fixing his penalty at
death. The following State statute governed the conduct of the voir dire
examination:
In trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror who
shall, on being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples
against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same.'
The Illinois supreme court had previously ruled that under the voir dire
statute the prosecution was permitted unlimited challenges for cause against
those prospective jurors who "might hesitate to return a verdict inflicting
[death].' 2 On the basis of this interpretation, the prosecution successfully
3
challenged for cause nearly one-half of the venire of prospective jurors.
72. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 803(a) (1), 82 Stat. 73, 82.
73. For a discussion of how the thirteenth amendment could have been used since
its inception as a basis for eliminating racial discrimination see A. Cox, M. Howt, &
J. WIGGINS, supra note 43, at 30.
1. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (Smith-Hurd 1935). This section was reenacted in 1961 but not expressly repeated in the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure
of 1963. See 38 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4(d) (Smith-Hurd 1967). The Illinois
supreme court has ruled, however, that section 115-4(d) incorporates the former
section 743. People v. Hobbs, 35 Ill.
2d 263, 274, 220 N.E.2d 469, 475 (1966).
2. People v. Carpenter, 13 Ill. 2d 470, 476, 150 N.E.2d 100, 103 (1958).
3. In all, 47 veniremen out of a total of 95 were excluded on the basis of their
beliefs on capital punishment. Only five of the 47 explictly stated they would never
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No attempt was made to ascertain whether the expressed "conscientious
scruples" of any particular juror would invariably have compelled him to
vote against the death penalty in all cases.
Petitioner's request for post-conviction relief was denied by the Circuit
Court and the Illinois supreme court affirmed. 4 On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, affirmed petitioner's conviction but reversed as to sentence, holding that the execution of a death
sentence imposed by a jury from which prospective members were excluded
for cause solely because they voiced general objections to the death penalty
or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction constitutes a deprivation of life without due process of law. Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
The Supreme Court first addressed itself to the problem of voir dire
examination in capital cases in 1892 in Logan v. United States.5 In Logan,
the procedure of excluding jurors with conscientious objections to capital
punishment was upheld on the ground that such jurors, because of their
beliefs, would be prevented "from standing indifferent between the government and the accused, and from trying the case according to law ....
6
The decision in Logan is representative of a long line of federal and State
cases supporting the practice of obtaining "death qualified" juries in capital
cases.7 Challenge for cause on this basis arose as a matter of practical
necessity 8 at a time when the sole function of the jury was to decide the
guilt or innocence of the accused, since the imposition of the death penalty
was a legislative determination automatically imposed upon conviction for
certain crimes.9 Presently, however, in almost all jurisdictions which still
retain capital punishment, 10 imposition of the death sentence is left to the
discretion of the jury after guilt has been determined." It has been argued
that this change in the function of the jury vitiates the historical justification for death qualification, namely, that jurors opposed to capital punishment might not be able to make a fair determination on the issue of guilt
knowing that the death penalty was a certainty upon conviction. 12 Although
vote to impose the death penalty. Six stated that they did not "believe in the penalty"
and 39 said that they had "conscientious or religious scruples against the infliction of the
death penalty" or against its infliction "in a proper case" and were therefore excluded.
4. People v. Witherspoon, 36 Ill. 2d 471, 224 N.E.2d 259 (1967).
5. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
6. Id. at 298.
7. See Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 560 (1956).
8. Williams v. State, 32 Miss. 389, 392 (1856).
9. See Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L.
Rpv. 1099-1101 (1953).
10. In the following States, capital punishment is no longer retained as punishment
for any offense: Alaska, Iowa, Maine Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. ALAsxA STAT. § 11 .15.0 10 (1962) ; IOWA CoDr ANN. § 690.2 (1967)
MZ. Rgv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1967); MICII. STAT. ANN. § 28.548 (1954);
MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (1964); OR. Rzv. STAT. § 163.010 (1967); W. VA. CODg
ANN. § 61-2-2 (1966) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (1958).
11. See generally Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 767-70 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
12. In United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1954), the defendant argued
that a modification of the federal statute, under which the death penalty was mandatory,bytoVillanova
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the death penalty is no longer automatic upon conviction for most crimes,
the procedure of excluding those opposed to capital punishment at voir dire
examinations still persists. 18
The decision in Witherspoon posed the following questions: (1) Was
the "death qualification" procedure as practiced by the Illinois State courts
prejudicial to the accused on the issue of sentence? (2) If so, did this
prejudice extend to prevent impartiality in the determination of guilt?
As to the issue of sentence, the Court's rationale in Witherspoon is
couched in terms of due process. In Irvin v. Dowd,1 4 the Court clearly
enunciated the principle that denial of a fair hearing by impartial jurors to
the criminally accused violates even minimal standards of due process. 15
Noting that these requirements of procedural fairness extend to the method
of sentence determination as well as that of guilt, 16 Mr. Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority in the instant case, posed the following analogy:
It is, of course, settled that a State may not entrust the determination
of whether a man is innocent or guilty to a tribunal "organized to
convict." . . . It requires but a short step from that principle to hold,

as we do today, that a State may not entrust the determination of
whether a man should
live or die to a tribunal organized to return
17
a verdict of death.
The standard the Court attempts to maintain is that of neutrality. 18 Under
this standard those prospective jurors who could never impose the death
penalty are clearly not neutral and therefore can successfully be challenged
for cause. Where the prospective jurors are only generally opposed to
capital punishment, however, exclusion cannot be justified for it is not
clear that such general personal views will prevent an impartial determination of sentence in all cases. What in effect the Court concludes is that
exclusion of this latter group results in the denial to the accused of an
impartial hearing on the issue of sentence since those members of the
community most likely to recommend mercy are not represented.',
With respect to the issue of whether the "death qualification" procedure results in an impartial determination of guilt, it is important to note
that the Court did not reverse the petitioner's conviction. The majority
of the Court expressly rejected the hypothesis that "death qualified" juries
are "prosecution prone"2 0 or less than neutral with respect to deciding a
jury impliedly vitiated the necessity for disqualification of jurors who had scruples
against capital punishment. The Second Circuit expressly rejected this contention
noting that this argument had been previously rejected by State courts. See, e.g.,
State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953) ; Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 88
N.W. 789 (1902).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1954).
14. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
15. Id. at 722-23.
16. 391 U.S. at 521 n.20.
17. Id. at 521.
18. Id. at 520.
19. Id.

20. For a detailed presentation of this hypothesis see Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair
Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 T]xAs L. Rev. 545 (1961).
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defendant's guilt. Since the Court noted that this particular sociological
hypothesis has not as yet become a matter of judicial notice, 21 it would
seem that the Court properly rejected it. This rejection, and the Court's
subsequent decision not to examine further the possible prejudicial effect
of "death qualification" on jurors' ability to impartially decide the guilt
issue, is based on the requirement that there be a showing of specific
prejudice on the issue of guilt in order to reverse the conviction.
As the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas aptly points out,
however, there is considerable authority 22 to the effect that where large,
identifiable groups 23 are systematically excluded from jury service, the
right of an accused to a jury representative of a cross section of the community 24 is violated and such a practice of exclusion is prejudicial per se.25

Exemplary of this view is Ballard v. United States26 which held that purposeful and systematic exclusion of women, entitled by law to serve, from
federal petit and grand juries required the dismissal of an indictment
obtained by such a panel without a showing of specific prejudice. Similar
27
cases have held the practice of systematic exclusion on the basis of race
28
and economic status unconstitutional.
Relying on these decisions, Mr.
Justice Douglas contends that the conviction of Witherspoon should also
have been reversed since no showing of specific prejudice on the guilt issue
was necessary. Inherent in this contention is the assumption that a jury
which is not representative of a cross section of the community is not fit to
adjudicate either sentence or guilt.
The concurring opinion not only differs from the majority view as to
the standard to be upheld in the jury selection process, but also as to the
group that can properly be dismissed on the basis of their views toward
capital punishment. Mr. Justice Douglas clearly expressed his point of view:
I see no constitutional basis for excluding those who are so
opposed to capital punishment that they would never inflict it on a
defendant. Exclusion of them means the selection of jurors who are
either protagonists of the death penalty or neutral concerning it.29
21. See, e.g., Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 724 (8th Cir. 1967) ; United
States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 1954). For a discussion of the matters
subject to judicial notice see Comment, The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial
Notice, 13 VILL. L. Rev. 530, 531-34 (1968).
22. Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) (color) ; Theil v. Southern Pac.
Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (economic status) ; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942) (sex).
23. The Supreme Court seems to consider those opposed to capital punishment
as a "large and identifiable group." The Court cites a recent public opinion poll
showing that in 1966, 42 percent of the American public favored capital punishment
for convicted murderers while 47 percent opposed it and 11 percent were undecided.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.16 (1968).
24. "It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of
public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community." Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
25. 391 U.S. at 531.
26. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
27. Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S.
128 (1940) ; Labat v. Bennet, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966).
28. Theil v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
391 U.S.University
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It appears from this language that the concurring Justice views the jury,
once it has been given discretion in regard to the imposition of capital
punishment, as a possible vehicle of mercy assuming that the community
from which it is selected is so inclined. Exclusion of those jurors, therefore, who are in accord with such community views on capital punishment
should accordingly be prohibited.
Mr. Justice White, in dissent, suggests that the decision in Witherspoon is in effect an attack on the death penalty itself.30 His approach
posits that neither the neutrality standard nor the "cross section of the
community" principle provides an adequate constitutional basis for the
Court's decision. The argument is that since the Court did not rule that
capital punishment offends the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment or that discretion as to its imposition must be
delegated to the jury by the legislature, the sentencing process for capital
crimes remains primarily a legislative determination. Mr. Justice White,
therefore, can see no reason why the legislature should be prohibited from
delegating the responsibility of deciding the appropriate penalty to a jury
that may impose capital punishment more often than a group chosen on the
basis of some other criteria.3 '
With respect to the possible effects of Witherspoon, the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Black questions whether, in fact, the guidelines
presented in Witherspoon will produce significantly different juries from
those selected under the Illinois statute. Mr. Justice Black apparently
views the instant decision as a warning to the States to change present jury
selection practices or risk a future decision by the Supreme Court that

their murder convictions have been obtained unconstitutionally.3 2 The
approach the Court might take, however, to link the process of "death
qualification" to the guilt issue was not made clear.

The concept of "systematic exclusion" as suggested by Mr. Justice
Douglas was used in Crawford v. Bounds,3 3 a recent Fourth Circuit decision, as a basis for holding the "death qualification" procedure unconstitutional. In reversing both the sentence and the conviction of the petitioner,
34
the court declined to rest its decision solely on due process considerations
but ruled that the process of "death qualification" denied the petitioner
equal protection of the law. Specifically the court held that:
[B]elief against capital punishment on the part of jurors who are
vested with a dichotomy of functions - the determination of the issue
of guilt, and, if guilt is found, the degree of punishment to be imposed - cannot be allowed to disqualify a substantial part of the venire
when it is not established that the views of the persons so disqualified
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 542.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 539.
395 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968).

34. Id. at 304. The court ruled that the manner of jury selection was patently

unfair in that jurors who were opposed to capital punishment were summarily excluded
while a juror who stated that he felt it was his duty to impose capital punishment
upon conviction was allowed to serve.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/7

14

Editors: Recent Developments
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

will preclude them from making a fair determination on the issue of
guilt, aside from the issue of punishment. Such disqualification prevents the jury in its function of determining the issue of guilt from
being fairly representative of the community, and thus violates equal
protection of the laws.8 5
At the basis of the Crawford court's equal protection argument are two
major contentions. Initially, the court reasoned that defendants in capital
cases are denied equal treatment in comparison with that afforded defendants in noncapital cases since the latter group is not tried by juries
selected in part on the basis of their views toward punishment. Secondly,
the court indicated that no legitimate basis for this unequal treatment
exists since the interest of the State in maintaining capital punishment as
a viable alternative to life imprisonment cannot stand paramount to the
constitutional right of an accused to an adjudication of the guilt issue by
a jury which is representative of a cross section of the community. 86 The
Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that only those jurors whose views
on capital punishment would interfere with a fair determination of the
guilt issue can constitutionally be excluded.
The Crawford decision recognized that its view of the proper basis
for exclusion may, in some cases, result in the effective nullification of
the death penalty:
We are also aware of the danger that if jurors, while agreeing upon
the guilt of the defendant, adopt intransigent positions on the issue
of punishment, no verdict on either guilt or punishment will be returned since a single verdict is required under North Carolina law,
and that this might "result in practical immunity from murder." . . .
But, the state has no constitutional right to the imposition of capital
has a constitutional protecpunishment in any case; and a defendant
87
tion against systematic exclusion.
Thus, it would appear that the Crawford mandate will require a fundamental change88 in trial procedure in order to maintain capital punishment
as a viable alternative penalty.
Prospectively, it would not seem that Witherspoon will similarly
require a significant change in federal and State procedure for voir dire
examination in capital cases. If upon examination a prospective juror
indicates general objections to the death penalty, the prosecution will
merely have to inquire further as to whether these objections are such as to
prevent that juror from imposing capital punishment in all cases. If this
is the case, a sufficient basis for challenge for cause will be established.
35. Id. at 308.

36. Id. at 310 n.14a.

37. Id. at 312.

38. Id. The court suggested as a possible solution that North Carolina adopt a
two-trial system which permits a second jury to pass on sentence and a first jury
to return only a verdict of guilt if the first jury is in disagreement as to punishment.
California, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania have adopted this procedural
device. CAL. PENAL COD4 § 190.1 (West Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-10 (1968); N.Y. PENAL CoDE § 125.35 (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4701 (1963).
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From a pragmatic point of view it is important to note that the decision
in Witherspoon, was made fully retroactive,8 9 whereas the Crawford court
did not address itself to this question. In those cases, therefore, where the
death penalty was imposed by a jury from which prospective members
were excluded for cause solely because they voiced general objections to
the death penalty, the death sentence must be reversed and a new hearing
on sentence granted. 40 However, the issue of sentence will not be tried
again in those cases where only life imprisonment was imposed, even if
the "death qualification" procedure was in direct violation of the Wither41
spoon doctrine.
The decision in Witherspoon does not represent an attack on the
"death qualification" procedure per se. Rather, the question before the
Court concerned the degree of opposition to capital punishment necessary
to sustain a challenge for cause. The decision represents an attempt by
the Court to establish definitive guidelines for voir dire examinations that
are in conformity with the presently expanding requirements of due process
at the pre-trial stage. 42 Whether the Court will at some future date expand
the decision in Witherspoon to encompass the rule in Crawford will depend
largely on the course of action taken by the States in regard to jury
selection procedure. 43 If, in fact, the Court concludes that "death qualification" results in a jury "less than neutral with respect to guilt," and thus
orders reversal of convictions, it is not likely that this will be done on a
retroactive basis since the practical difficulties of absent witnesses and
preservation of evidence in granting new trials on the issue of guilt would
be overbearing.
Finally, it is most important to note that nothing in the Witherspoon
decision prevents a State from allowing the trial judge to disregard a jury's
finding that life imprisonment rather than death be imposed 44 or from,
as the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White suggests, replacing the
requirement of unanimous jury verdicts on the sentence issue with the
less stringent requirement of majority decisions. 45 Implicit in the decision
in Witherspoon, therefore, is the ruling that a defendant does not have a
constitutional right per se to have the sentence issue adjudicated by a jury.
The States may effectively vitiate the nullifying effect of the Witherspoon
doctrine on capital punishment by simply refusing to allow the jury to
39. 391 U.S. at 523 n.22.
40. See Irving v. Breazelle, No. 24606 (5th Cir., Aug. 27, 1968); Williams v.
Dutton, No. 25349 (5th Cir., Aug. 20, 1968).
41. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545 (1968).
42. See generally McClelland, Conscientious Scruples Against the Death Penalty
in Pennsylvania, 30 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 252, 259 (1959); Comment, Jury Challenges,
Capital Punishment, and Labat v. Bennet: A Reconciliation, 1968 DuKz L.J. 283.
43. The sixth amendment requirement of an "impartial" jury is now applicable

to the States because of the incorporation of the jury clause of the sixth amendment
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Witherspoon v. Illinois,

391 U.S. 510, 529 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) ; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968).
44. 391 U.S. at 518 n.12.
45. Id. at 542 n.2.
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make the sentence determination. If this is the course the States pursue,
the Supreme Court may feel it necessary to address the problem of capital
punishment on the merits and to decide whether its imposition in particular
or all cases violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment.

46

David J. Griffith
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CONFESSION AT JOINT TRIAL HELD VIOLATIVE OF SIXTH AMENDMENT CONFRONTATION

CLAUSE.

Bruton v. United States (U.S. 1968)
Petitioner Bruton and one Evans were jointly tried and convicted of
the federal crime of armed postal robbery.' At the trial a postal inspector
who investigated the case testified that Evans orally confessed to him that
he and the petitioner committed the robbery. The trial judge instructed
the jury that although Evans' confession was competent evidence against
Evans there was no doubt that it was clearly inadmissible as hearsay against

the petitioner and therefore was to be disregarded in determining petitioner's guilt or innocence. 2 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit set aside Evans'
conviction since the confession should not have been used against him ;3
46. In Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), the Supreme Court denied

certiorari on the issue of whether the eighth amendment prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty on a convicted rapist. It is submitted that the Court may in the
near future rule that the taking of human life to protect a value other than human
life is violative of the eighth amendment. The more difficult question, of course, is
whether the imposition of capital punishment can be held unconstitutional on eighth
amendment grounds where the crime being punished involves the taking of human life.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1964).
2. The trial judge's instructions were sufficiently clear in stating that Evans'
admission implicating petitioner
if used, can only be used against the defendant Evans. It is hearsay insofar as the
defendant George William Bruton is concerned, and you are not to consider it in any
respect to the defendant Bruton, because insofar as he is concerned it is hearsay.
391 U.S. at 125 n.2. The instructions continued:
A confession made outside of court by one defendant may not be considered
as evidence against the other defendant, who was not present and in no way a
party to the confession. Therefore, if you find that a confession was in fact
voluntarily and intentionally made by the defendant Evans, you should consider
it as evidence in the case against Evans, but you must not consider it, and should
disregardit, in considering the evidence in the case against the defendant Bruton.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. The trial began June 20, 1966, 1 week after the decision in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), noted in 12 VILL. L. Rsv. 198 (1966). Miranda and its companion cases were therefore applicable in determining the admissibility of Evans'
confession. On the merits, the court of appeals held that the admissions to the postal
inspector "were tainted and infected by the poison of the prior, concededly unconstitutional confession . . . ." Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 361 (8th Cir.
1967), rev'd sub nom., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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however, relying on Delli Paoli v. United States,4 the court affirmed as to

the petitioner since the jury was properly instructed to disregard Evans'
inadmissible confession as it related to petitioner's guilt.- On certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court in a six to two decision reversed
holding that
because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to
the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in
determining petitioner's guilt, admission of Evans' confession in this
joint trial violated petitioner's right of cross-examination
secured by
7
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
Limiting instructions have long served as a judicial tool to protect
parties to a litigation when certain evidence is deemed admissible on one
issue yet inadmissible on another, or admissible against one defendant but
not another." More particularly, instructing the jury to consider evidence
only for its legally proper purpose has served, in theory, to protect the
objecting party from the specific prejudice which would otherwise require
exclusion of that evidence. 9 The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is similarly a trial protection in criminal cases in that it secures the
defendant's opportunity to cross-examine the trial witness and insures that
the jury will have the opportunity to observe the testifying witness'
demeanor.' 0 Focusing more directly on the opportunity to cross-examine,
cases interpreting the confrontation clause have held that absence of this
opportunity results in the denial of an accused's sixth amendment right
to confront his accuser." In 1965 the Supreme Court in Pointer v. Texas 12
recognized that this clause of the sixth amendment applies to the States
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The precise issue facing the Supreme Court in Bruton was whether
the conviction of a defendant at a joint trial must be set aside due to denial
of his sixth amendment right of confrontation, despite the fact that the jury
was specifically instructed to disregard a codefendant's inculpating yet
inadmissible confession. Faced with the very same issue 11 years earlier,
the Supreme Court in Delli Paoli v. United States" held that the use of
sufficiently clear limiting instructions in a joint trial made it "reasonably
possible" for a jury to disregard a confessor's extrajudicial statement that
4. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).

5. Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd sub noni., Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
6. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
7. 391 U.S. at 126. In Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), the Supreme
Court applied Bruton retroactively.
8. See C. MCCORMICK, EvIDSNCE § 59, at 136 (1954) ; 1 J. WIGMORE, EvIDYNCE
§ 13, at 299-303 (3d ed. 1940).
9. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 8.
10. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 1395.
11. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). For a compilation of cases supporting this proposition see Annot., U.S.C.A. CONST. AMEND. VI, at 75-77 (1964).
12. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
13. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
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his codefendant participated with him in committing a crime.' 4 Delli Paoli
was grounded in the presumption that the jury in such circumstances had
the ability to follow the trial judge's limiting instructions to disregard
references to the codefendant and to consider the evidence only for its proper
purpose. Consequently, no constitutional question could arise under the
confrontation clause since the case was then treated as if the confessor made
no statement or reference to his codefendant.
The basic premise of Delli Paoli - the validity of a juror's ability to
place inadmissible incriminating evidence out of his mind in prejudicial
circumstances - was first rejected by the United States Supreme Court
in Jackson v. Denno.15 In Jackson, the Court held that a jury, once it
decided that the defendant's confession was inadmissible because involuntarily given, could not then be asked to disregard that confession in determining that same defendant's guilt on the merits. 16 Although the Court in
Jackson was faced with an extremely difficult situation for justifying the
use of limiting instructions, the majority opinion reflected the Court's view
toward the use of limiting instructions in prejudicial circumstances. The
majority relied on Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Delli Paoli wherein
he stated:
The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition against misuse
is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible
declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors. The admonition therefore becomes a futile collocation of words and fails of its
purpose as a legal protection
to defendants against whom such a
7
declaration should not tell.'
The Court's analysis in Bruton closely follows the approach adopted
in Jackson. It was recognized in Bruton that a joint trial is a context in which there is the possibility of prejudice to a codefendant where
confessions are used; in such a context the jury will not follow limiting instructions and will therefore use an inadmissible confession for
an improper purpose. Where the codefendant is inadequately protected
from this danger of improper use so as to place a specific constitutional
right in substantial jeopardy, then the risk of impairment to that codefendant's rights is too great, and the use of limiting instructions cannot
be sanctioned. As noted previously, the rejected procedure in Jackson
allowed the jury to determine that a confession was inadmissible because
involuntarily given, yet expected the same jury to disregard the inad14. Id. at 239.
15. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).

16. Id. at 388-89.
17. 352 U.S. at 247 (emphasis added). Mr. Justice White. writing for the majority
in Jackson, was influenced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent, when he stated: "(T]he
Government should not have the windfall of having the jury be influenced by evidence
against a defendant which, as a matter of law, they should not consider but which they
cannot put out of their minds." Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388 n.15 (1964).
See also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949), where Mr. Justice
Jackson stated that "[tihe naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome
by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."
Id. at 453 (concurring opinion).
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missible confession in determining the defendant's guilt. This procedure
placed the defendant's fifth amendment guarantee against compelled selfincrimination in jeopardy since it did not "adequately protect Jackson's
right to be free of a conviction based upon a coerced confession .
1...
8
The lower court in Bruton followed a procedure similar to the one rejected
by the Supreme Court in Jackson in allowing the jury to hear defendant
Evans' confession which implicated codefendant Bruton, and then expecting
them to disregard those inculpatory references in determining Bruton's
guilt. Similar to the circumstances in Jackson this procedure also placed
a constitutional protection - petitioner's sixth amendment right to confrontation - in jeopardy since it "added substantial, perhaps even critical,
weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, since Evans did not take the stand."'19 Such an approach does not
cast doubt on the capabilities of jurors or the maintenance of the jury
system, 20 but, rather, squarely faces the jury's human shortcomings in a
particular context. The Bruton court was thereby able to repudiate the
underlying rationale of Delli Paoli and to overrule that case as establishing
an unsound constitutional doctrine.
In determining the constitutional validity of limiting instructions as a
prophylactic device in a particular case, the Bruton opinion suggests proceeding in two steps. First, the trial context and procedures must be
examined to find whether, under the circumstances, there exists a likelihood
that the jury will not follow the limiting instructions and therefore use
the evidence improperly. Secondly, it must be determined whether such
an improper use of the evidence will unduly jeopardize the effectiveness
of a constitutional guarantee.
In facts similar to the instant case, Justice Traynor, reasoning from
Jackson, found the trial context and procedures prejudicial:
Although Jackson was directly concerned with obviating any risk
that a jury might rely on an unconstitutionally obtained confession in
determining the defendant's guilt, its logic extends to obviating the
risks that the jury might rely on any inadmissible statements. If it is
a denial of due process to rely on a jury's presumed ability to disregard an involuntary confession, it may also be a denial of due process
to rely on a jury's presumed ability to disregard a codefendant's confession implicating another defendant
when it is determining that
21
defendant's guilt or innocence.
Although Justice Traynor's reading of Jackson is cast in terms of due
process, his "fairness" rationale was clearly utilized by the majority in
Bruton22 to repudiate the principles underlying the holding of Delli Paoli.
18. 378 U.S. at 377.
19. 391 U.S. at 128.

20. Mr. Justice Clark expressed the view that the Court's holding in Jackson

-

the jury's inability to segregate the issues and thereby abide by the limiting instructions - "lends its weight to the destruction of this great safeguard to our liberties."
378 U.S. at 426 (dissenting opinion).
21. People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 528-29, 407 P.2d 265, 271, 47 Cal. Rptr.

353, 359 (1965).
22. 391 U.S. at 130-31.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/7
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In addition, the Bruton Court noted that the recently amended rule 14 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, authorizing severance of defendants or trials, is based on the theory that the prejudice created by using
a codefendant's extrajudicial confession in a joint trial is not eradicable
23
through the use of limiting instructions.
Once the trial context is found to be prejudicial, the Court's next step
is to balance the effect of the jury's inability to follow limiting instructions
against the petitioner's specific constitutional rights. It appears that the
effect on the outcome of the case is an important factor to the Court's
decision, for as the Court noted, the fact that some prejudicial effects may
be incurred is not sufficient, in itself, to invoke constitutional safeguards. 24
The situation must result in a finding that
the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great,
and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.2 5
A factor which the Court apparently uses to upset this balance is not
merely the fact that inadmissible evidence is placed before the jury, but
that its reliability is inevitably suspect. In Bruton, the unreliability of the
codefendant's confession was compounded by its inadmissibility against
the confessor; additionally the confessor himself failed to testify or subject
2
himself to cross-examination.
Reasoning to a denial of the right to confrontation was not a difficult
task, assuming the Court's basic premise that the jury is unable to follow
limiting instructions. The Court relied on Douglas v. Alabama,27 where
the prosecutor read statements from the confession of defendant Loyd
under the "guise" of refreshing his memory. Such statements inculpated
codefendant Douglas. Loyd, relying on his privilege against self-incrimina23. Id. at 131-32.
24. In cautioning against complete abandonment of limiting instructions, the Court
stated that
[niot every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered
to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances occur
in almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently.
391 U.S. at 135. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953) (since the
record "fairly shrieks the guilt of the parties" the one wrong admission could not
have possibly influenced the jury to reach an improper verdict) ; Hopt v. Utah, 120
U.S. 430 (1887) (prosecutor's statement as to the number of times the case had been
before the courts was not viewed as referring to any previous verdict and therefore
was not prejudicial) ; FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.") (emphasis
added).
25. 391 U.S. at 135.
26. Id. at 136. The Court has found limiting instructions insufficient to maintain
the balance in other instances: Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U.S. 552 (1901) (lengthy
trial and uncertainty concerning what evidence was inadmissible) ; Mora v. United
States, 190 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1951) (limiting instructions delayed until the final
charge to the jury where inadmissible testimony was the only substantial evidence
implicating the codefendant). See Holt v. United States, 94 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1937)
(prejudice created by an inadmissible confession must have influenced the jury since
the competent evidence on the conspirator's guilt was far from conclusive).
27. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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tion, neither denied nor affirmed that he had made the confession. In
finding that Douglas was denied his right to cross-examine secured by the
confrontation clause of the Constitution, the Court noted that
[a]lthough the Solicitor's reading of Loyd's alleged statement . . .
[was] not technically testimony, the Solicitor's reading may well have
been the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony that Loyd in fact
made the statement ....

28

By analogizing the facts of the instant case to those of Douglas, the Bruton
Court reasoned that since Evans' inculpating confession was in fact
testified to by the postal inspector and was therefore actually in evidence
(as opposed to the nonevidence use of refreshing the witness' memory
used in Douglas), even less protection was offered to petitioner Bruton
29
than was afforded the petitioner in Douglas.
The majority opinion failed to note, however, the specific alternative
procedures available to the courts to protect a codefendant from
the prejudicial effects of another's extrajudicial confession. In dissent,80
Mr. Justice White suggested that three choices will be open to the courts
and prosecutors in order to escape reversal under the Bruton ruling: (1)
the inculpating references to petitioner in codefendant's confession may be
effectively deleted ;31 (2) if deletion is not feasible, it may be decided that
the confession should not be used; or (3) the defendants may be tried
32
separately.
The importance of the instant decision lies mainly in its effects on
conducting joint criminal trials in general, and conspiracy trials in particular, especially in light of the choices available to prosecutors and the
courts suggested by the dissent. The arguments offered for joining defendants or trials have traditionally been justified by the policy of judicial
economy - joint trials minimize the burden on witnesses, prosecutors, and
courts, avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial, and avoid
varying consequences for legally indistinguishable defendants.3 3 The instant case indicates that the justification of judicial economy will not be
controlling where the risk of prejudice outweighs its benefits. In accord28. Id. at 419.

29. 391 U.S. at 127.
30. Id. at 138-44.
31. Mr. Justice White cautioned that "the deletion must not be such that it will
distort the statements to the substantial prejudice of either the declarant or the
Government." Id. at 143 (dissenting opinion). For a discussion of effective deletion
see Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 194 (1953); Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d
863, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
32. Theorizing on the practical aspects of such choices, Mr. Justice White stated:
To save time, money, and effort, the Government might best seek a ruling
at the earliest possible stage of the trial proceedings as to whether the confession is admissible once offending portions are deleted. The failure of the
Government to adopt and follow proper procedures for insuring that the inadmissible portions of confessions are excluded will be relevant to the question
of whether it was harmless error for them to have gotten before the jury.
Id. at 144 (dissenting opinion).
33. Id. at 143 (dissenting opinion).
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ance with the rationale espoused in Bruton, where a confession in a joint
trial is critical evidence to the government's case or strongly implicates a
codefendant, severing the trials would doubtlessly be appropriate and perhaps necessary to preserve convictions. Where the confession is tangentially
significant or where the danger of prejudice to the codefendant is slight,
judicial economy would dictate joinder but seemingly it would not be
proper until there is deletion of all reference to a codefendant as is indi34

cated by Bruton.

Criminal conspiracy trials, as previously noted, will also be acutely
affected by the rationale supporting Bruton. It is here that the joint or
mass trial is employed most frequently since the elements of a conspiracy
charge demand that the prosecuting officials prove some concerted action
or agreement among defendants in order to obtain convictions A5 An
extrajudicial confession by one party to the conspiracy implicating a
coconspirator in a given circumstance may be the prime evidence used to
prove the existence of the conspiracy where other evidence is scant.
Effective deletion of any reference in the confession to the inculpated codefendant would seriously hamper the prosecutor's ability to prove the
element of agreement by limiting his evidentiary tools to circumstantial
or extrinsic evidence. If effective deletion is not feasible without imperiling
the prosecution's case then the only alternative will be to forego entirely the
use of the confession. Due to the practical need for joinder in these cases,
severing the trials, especially where the government is attempting to prove
the existence of a "gang-size" conspiracy, appears to be an unduly burdensome task and one which bespeaks its own ineffectiveness.
Although the narrow holding in Bruton is based on a denial of confrontation, the due process rationale employed by the Court may have
broader implications with respect to the future use of limiting instructions
at all trials where a jury's inability to follow the judge's directive results
in serious prejudice. If limiting instructions do not afford an accused in a
joint trial adequate protection from substantial risk of prejudice resulting
from use of a codefendant's confession then, arguably, they may not offer
an accused in an individual trial such protection when the prosecutor resorts
to using the multiple relevance rule3" or exceptions to the hearsay rule
especially when the evidence is extremely damaging.
The most criticized example of such use is when a defendant's
prior criminal record is introduced into evidence for the purpose of impeaching his credibility.37 The practice of using past records involving
34. See 1967 DUKE L.J. 202.
35. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 447-48 & n.4 (1949) (concurring opinion).
36. Here evidence may be offered against the accused on one issue whereas it
would be inadmissible on another ground. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469
(1948) ; Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 89-90 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; C. McCoRMICK,
supra note 8, § 157, at 327; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, §§ 192-94.
37. See MODEL CODE or EVIDENCE, rule 106 (1942) ; UNIFORM RULES O1tEVIDENCE
21; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 43, at 94; 3 J. WiGMORE, supra note 8, § 982, at
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any and all types of criminal conduct to impeach credibility generally, as
opposed to using only a record of those crimes which specifically involve
a lack of veracity, such as perjury, fraud, and forgery, has been subject to
question. 8 Recent studies have established that use of prior criminal
records as impeaching evidence not only creates risk of prejudice, but also
adversely affects a defendant's chances for acquittal.89 It has been argued
that the jury in arriving at convictions must have used the evidence irrationally, applying its probative value to the issue of guilt and not credibility.
If these studies are correct, the question arises whether the prosecutor has
obtained a conviction without having introduced sufficient evidence on the
issue of guilt to establish that guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 40 It has
been argued further that the effects of the prejudice resulting from impeachment by the use of records of prior convictions jeopardizes the
defendant's constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury and to equal
42
1
protection of the law. 4 While the question of a fair and impartial jury
could be reached through an analysis of the empirical data contained in
the aforementioned studies, 48 a denial of equal protection of the law could
be found where the defendant-witness was cross-examined regarding all
prior convictions regardless of their nature. Such a use could lead to
unreasonably classifying the defendant as untruthful because of the absence
44
of a reasonable nexus between all crimes and the defendant's veracity.
It is clear that the principal case has taken a further step toward
judicial recognition of the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions where the
resultant effect is to sacrifice specifically protected constitutional rights.
As a logical extension of Bruton, however, it may be argued that despite
limiting instructions, the possibility that the jury either considered the
evidence on inadmissible grounds or was unable to follow the instructions
creates a risk of prejudice so great that the accused is denied a due process
550; Ladd, Credibility Tests - Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. RAv. 166, 182 (1940);
Comment, Impeaching the Accused by His Prior Crimes - A New Approach to an
Old Problem, 19 HAsTINGs L.J. 919 (1968); Comment, Constitutional Problems
Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction Evidence for the Purpose
of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness, 37 U. CIN. L. Rgv. 168
(1968). Most State statutes authorize use of such evidence for the purpose of affecting
the weight of the witness' testimony. See 2 J. WIGMORZ, supra note 8, § 488, for a
list of the various statutes.

38. See 3 J. WiGMORE, supra note 8, § 982, at 550.
39. H. KALvtN & H. ZOISEL, THE A ERICAN JURY, table 52, at 160-61 (1966).

The strength of the evidence was kept constant while the defendants were divided into
two groups. The number of acquittals in the first group - those which the jury either

knew or suspected had a criminal record - was 27 percent lower than the number
in the second group - where the defendant either had no criminal record or the jury
was unaware of its existence.
40. MCCORMICK, Some High Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TEXAS
L. Rzv. 559, 568 (1955).
41. Comment, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior
Record Conviction Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the
Defendant Witness, 37 U. CIN. L. Rmv. 168, 173-80 (1968).

42. In Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681
(1942), the court combined both doctrines into the single determination of due process
as demanded by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 781.
43. See note 39 supra.
44. See Comment, supra note 41, at 179-80.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/7
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guarantee to a fair trial. The Bruton opinion is couched in such due process
language. It is not inconceivable that the standards used in assessing the
degree of prejudice to a particular defendant when limiting instructions
are ineffective are those same notions of fairness and due process. The
constitutional right then placed in jeopardy might ultimately be due process
of law.
Gilbert Newman

CORPORATIONS

INSIDER SHARE TRADING TRADING WITHOUT
DISCLOSURE OF PROSPECTIVE MINE HELD To VIOLATE RULE 10b-5.

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (2d Cir. 1968)
On November 8, 1963, Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (TGS) began mineral
drilling operations for a geophysical survey on a segment of its land near
Timmins, Ontario. Four days later, the initial drilling revealed such potential that it was thought desirable to acquire more land in the area. To facilitate such an acquisition, Stephens, TGS president, ordered that the results
and existence of the drilling be kept confidential, even from the company's
other directors and officials. Drilling on the site was discontinued until
March 31, 1964. During the period of discontinuance, the 11 individual
defendants, who were officers, directors, and employees of TGS, were
charged with having traded in stocks and stock options on the basis of inside
undisclosed information in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,1 and rule lOb- 52 promulgated thereunder.
Drilling at several other sites was commenced during the first week
of April 1964. Meanwhile, rumors began to circulate that TGS had made
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1963) reads in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly

or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
2. SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
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a rich strike. On Sunday, April 12, TGS issued a press release from
Canada claiming that drilling to that date had been inconclusive and that
rumors of a rich strike were without any basis in fact. This release appeared
in United States newspapers the next morning. At 9:40 a.m. on April 16,
TGS announced a strike of 25 million tons. Between the first release on
April 12 (the denial) and the second on April 16 (the confirmation), only
two defendants, Clayton and Crawford, were engaged in security trading.
Another defendant, Coates, left the TGS press conference of April 16
while it was in progress to telephone his broker. With these exceptions,
all purchases made by defendants and their "tippees" were made before
April 9.3

The Securities and Exchange Commission brought an action in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York citing the following
violations of rule lOb-5: 1) the purchase of stock on the basis of undisclosed inside information by nine of the 11 individual defendants; 2) the
divulging of inside information to "tippees" by two of the individual defendants; 3) the purchasing of stock options by five of the defendants from
members of the board of directors of TGS who were unaware of the new
strike; and 4) the issuance of a false, misleading, and deceptive press
release by TGS, the corporate defendant. The SEC requested the following relief: 1) that individual defendants be restrained from purchasing
or selling stock on the basis of unavailable information; 2) that offers of
rescission be made by individual defendants to each person from whom
they purchased shares; 3) that the defendants be required to offer restitution to the persons who sold to the insiders' "tippees"; 4) that stock options
be cancelled and any profits be returned to the company; and 5) that the
company be enjoined from issuing any materially false, misleading, inadequate, or inaccurate press releases.
The district court found that Clayton and Crawford violated rule4
lOb-5, but dismissed the complaint against TGS and the other defendants.
Clayton and Crawford appealed the decision rendered against them, and
the SEC appealed the dismissal as to the other defendants. The Court
3. The district court selected April 9 as a critical date since testimony by defendants' experts established that the drilling of three holes prior to 7 p.m. on April 9
did not conclusively determine that TGS had struck a valuable mine. SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
4. Id. at 296. For discussions of the district court case see Fleischer, Securities
Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf
Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. Rzv. 1271 (1965); Kennedy & Wander, Texas Gulf
Sulphur, A Most Unusual Case, 20 Bus. LAW. 1057 (1965); Ruder, Corporate
Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws: The Codification Implications
of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. Rvv. 872 (1967) ; Whitney, Section 10b-5:
From Cady, Roberts to Texas Gulf: Matters of Disclosure, 21 Bus. LAW. 193 (1965) ;
Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.: The Inside and Outside of Rule 10b-5, 46
B.U.L. lev. 205 (1966); Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur and the Duty of Disclosure,
Another View, 55 Gxo. L.J. 664 (1967); Comment, Securities Exchange Act Statutory Fraud Under Section lOb and Rule X-lOb-5, 12 N.Y.L.F. 318 (1966);
Comment, Rule 1OB-5 and Texas Gulf Sulphur: An Evolution of Questions and
Answers, 20 U. MIAMi L. Rv. 939 (1966) ; Note, Civil Liability Under Section lOB
and Rule 1OB-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J.
658 (1965) ; 8 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rsv. 353 (1967) ; 80 HARV. L. Riv. 468 (1966);
41 TUL. L. Rgv. 722 (1967).
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision as to Clayton and
Crawford but reversed the dismissal as to all but one individual defendant,
holding that the individual defendants violated rule 10b-5 in their dealings
and remanding as to whether the corporate defendant's press release was
misleading to the reasonable investor, and if found to be misleading, whether
the court in its discretion should issue the injunction which the SEC seeks.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., No. 30882 (2d Cir., Aug. 13, 1968),
petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1968) (No. 533).
After the market crash of 1929, the federal government commenced
active participation in the regulation of security transactions. The Securities Act of 19335 was enacted to provide the investor with full disclosure
concerning new stock issues, 6 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19347
was designed primarily to protect the investor against manipulation and
unfair practices and to insure fairness in corporate share trading.8
Basic to the implementation of these purposes is the imposition, pursuant to rule lOb-5, of a duty on insiders to disclose material facts before
trading in their company's securities. This duty to disclose was explained
in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. as follows:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. 9
When one has the obligation to disclose material facts, rule 10b-5 has
been interpreted to protect both buyers and sellers of securities, 10 to apply
to transactions on exchanges as well as face-to-face," and to impose liability
2
for trading in total silence.1
The instant case is significant in that it explores the outer boundaries
of the impact of rule l0b-5. To at least one commentator," the district
court's disposition of the case enlarged the scope of the rule. If this be the
case, the court of appeals' reversal of the dismissal of nine of the individual
defendants and its remand of the corporate defendant represents a tenfold
expansion. Although the conflicting conclusions reached by the appellate
and district courts result partly from conflicting interpretations of the
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1964).

6. H.R. RP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1964).
8. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934) ; 3 L. Loss, SECURITIS
R GULATION 1455-56 (2d ed. 1961).
9. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
10. E.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Matheson v. Ambrust, 284
F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466 (D.
Del. 1962).
11. E.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965). See also 3 L. Loss, S1cuaRITMs RtGULATION 1455-56 (2d
ed. 1961).
12. E.g., Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); Hughes & Trewt, 22 S.E.C. 623, 626 (1946).
13. 80 HAnv. L. REv. 468 (1966).
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facts,'14 the major disagreement is in the differing legal standards to be
applied to those facts.
In any controversy involving rule lOb-5 and the problem of insider
share trading, five major issues are pivotal: 1) who are insiders; 2) what
type of information is material within the ambit of the rule; 3) when may
insiders begin to trade after public disclosure; 4) what is the impact of the
"inconnection with" requirement of the rule on the corporate defendants;
and 5) what remedies are available.
The appellate court's reversal of the district court was not based on
differing definitions of an insider. The generally accepted standard, expounded in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 5 focuses on the individual's access
to information and his relatively unfair position in the market. This
standard was adopted unqualifiedly by both courts.
The major point of disagreement, however, involved the standard
applied to determine the materiality of the facts allegedly undisclosed.
Rule lOb-5 dictates that in certain situations, which are essentially extraordinary and which, if disclosed to the public, are reasonably certain to
have a substantial effect on the market price of the security, a duty arises
either to disclose the basic facts or to refrain from insider share trading 6
This duty arises only with respect to material facts; one's own analysis
of those freely available facts may be kept confidential during trading
without a violation.11 In the instant case, the controversy between the
district and appellate courts centers on whether knowledge of the existence
and analysis of the first core drilling at Timmins is a material fact within
the meaning of rule 10b-5.
In expressing the basic standard for materiality, the appellate court,
quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,' 8 stated: "The basic test of materiality . . . is whether a reasonable man would attach importance . . .

[to the undisclosed facts] in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question."' 9 The court explained that this test of materiality
would include any basic fact or set of facts which might affect the value
of the corporation's securities.20 The court then proposed a balanc14. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., No. 30882, 3650-92 (2d Cir., Aug.

13, 1968) (dissenting opinion), petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept.
17, 1968) (No. 533).

15. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
16. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965) ; Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
17. See Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for
Defrauded Investors, 59 YALs L.J. 1120, 1148 (1950), where the author explains:
"Even though a shrewd guess by an insider is often worth fifty accounting statements,

it would be highly unfair to make him publicize his guess and then hold him responsible if it turns out to be wrong."

18. 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).

19. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., No. 30882, 3608 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968),
petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1968) (No. 533). See
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS 565-66 (1956); W. PROSSER, TORTS 554-55 (2d ed.
1955) ; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) op TORTS § 538(2) (a) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).

20. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., No. 30882, 3608 (2d Cir., Aug. 13, 1968),
petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1968) (No. 533).
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ing test to determine the materiality of facts. This test would compare
both the probability of the occurrence of an event and the magnitude
of the event, if it does occur, with the company's total activities. 2' Applying this balancing test to the instant case, the appellate court found
that knowledge of the first core drilling was a material fact. While there
was testimony that the results of a single core do not prove the existence
of a mine and that there was no way of knowing the true extent of the mine,
the possible magnitude of the strike if the first core proved representative
of a large area was found to be controlling. The appellate court further
stated that an important index of the relative probability and magnitude is
the reaction of those who knew about the first core and the importance
they attached to it, and that the amount of stock and "calls" purchased
by the individual defendants and the timing of such purchases compelled
the inference that the insiders were highly influenced. 22 The court concluded that disclosure of the drilling might have affected the price of TGS
stock and would have been an important fact to a reasonable, if speculative,
23
investor in deciding whether to buy and sell and, thus, was a material fact.
In a lengthy dissent, Circuit Judge Moore argued that the appellate
court, by disregarding the uncontradicted findings of fact by the trial court,
violated rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 24 The dissent insisted that since expert testimony played a key role in the trial court25
and since it could not be said that the district court's findings of fact
were clearly erroneous, the appellate court should not have set aside the
trial court's finding that until 7 p.m. on April 9 the drill results did not
provide material information. 26 This disagreement between the dissent and
majority appears to be largely a dispute over what is an2 7ultimate fact,
reviewable by the appellate court, and what is a basic fact.
The dissent goes on to bolster the district court's finding by arguing
that disclosure of the results of the first drilling not only were not material
but would have been illegal under the Commission's own rules. 28 With
regard to the disclosure of claims of strikes, SEC standards provide that
no claim shall be made as to the existence of a body of ore until found to
be proven or proveable ore defined as so extensively sampled that risk of
failure is reduced to a minimum.2 9 This argument, however, overlooks
the fact that the insiders need not have disclosed that a body of ore existed
but merely have revealed the facts which they knew - the existence of
21. Id. at 3609.

22. Id. at 3612.
23. Id. at 3610-14.
24. F D. R. Civ. P. 52(a) states in part: "Findings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
25. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., No. 30882, 3653-54 (2d Cir., Aug. 13, 1968),
petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1968)

(No. 533).

26. Id. at 3664.

27. Id. at 3609 n.11.
28. Id. at 3657-58.
29. 1 CCH FID. Stc. L. Rp. 7327, 8A (b) (c).
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one core and its analysis. This would involve no speculation by the insiders
and would not be construed as a premature announcement.
As the appellate court noted, however, its primary disagreement with
the district court did not concern findings of fact, but rather the appropriate
legal standard applicable to them.30 The district court took the following approach to the question of materiality: "But the test of materiality must
necessarily be a conservative one, particularly since many actions under
Section 10(b) are brought on the basis of hindsight." 3' 1 Viewing the test
in this way the conclusion of the district court was that the results of the
drilling were "too remote" to be material ;32 that in order for the results
to be deemed material, it would have to be "reasonably certain [that], if
disclosed, [the information] would have had a substantial impact on the
market price of TGS stock." 33
- Ihe difference between the two standards seems to be one of inference. The appellate court's test suggests an inference that undisclosed
information is material and all that need be shown is that its disclosure
might affect the market value and would have been an important fact to a
reasonable, if speculative, investor. On the other hand, the district court's
test raises an inference that the information is not material and requires
reasonable certainty of a substantial effect before information is found
to be material.
In deciding which test best reflects the aims and goals of rule lOb-5, it
must be remembered that basic to the rule is the concept of fairness. The
purpose of rule lOb-5 is to ensure that investors have equal access to the rewards of participating in securities transactions; that they have equal risks;
and that they stand on equal footing.3 4 From this viewpoint it is clear why
the court of appeals held that all transactions in TGS stock by those
apprised of the results of the first core violated rule lOb-5 35 - the inside
investors had nothing to lose and took no risks. If the mine proved to be
worthless, the value of their stock would not be affected since the public's
expectations were never raised and could not be dashed. 30 On the other
hand, they were assured of a high profit as soon as the news of the strike
was released.
Once the insider deems the information material and makes a full
disclosure, the question remains as to how soon after public disclosure
he may act. In the instant case, the announcement of a significant strike
was made in Canada on April 16 at 9:40 a.m., at 10 a.m. in the United
30. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., No. 30882, 3610 (2d Cir., Aug. 13, 1968),
petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1968) (No. 533).
31. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(emphasis added).
32. Id. at 283.
33. Id. at 282 (emphasis added).
34. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., No. 30882, 3613-14 (2d Cir., Aug. 13, 1968),
Petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1968) (No. 533).
35. Id. at 3614.
36. Id.
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States, appeared over Merrill Lynch wires at 10:29 a.m., and over Dow
Jones at 10:54 a.m. Crawford telephoned his orders to his Midwestern
broker about midnight on April 15 and again at 8:30 a.m. on April 16 with
instructions to buy that morning. Coates left the press conference and
placed his orders no later than 10:20 a.m. The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's decision which held that both defendants violated rule
10b--5 in "beating the news. 3 7 The court of appeals stated the test for
determining when, after disclosure is made, insiders may legally trade:
Before insiders may act upon material information, such information
must have been effectively disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure its
availability to the investing public.... The reading of a news release...
is merely the first step in the process of dissemination required for
compliance with the regulatory objective of providing all investors with
an equal opportunity to make informed investment judgments.8 8
In interpreting the meaning of an informed investment judgment, the court
stated that in cases where the facts are not readily translatable into investment action, the insiders may not trade immediately upon disclosure and
thereby take advantage of their prior opportunity to evaluate the information.39 This standard would seem to be an invitation to ambiguity. Would
the application of this standard require the length of the waiting period
to vary with the complexity of the information? What if some of the
other investors do not have the experts on hand necessary to translate
such information into action? Would the insiders have to wait until such
experts are obtained? Must the investors who have experts readily available also refrain from investing? The court provides no measure by which
insiders can estimate what is a reasonable period under the circumstances.
4
40
It is apparent, as the appellate court and at least one commentator '
have recognized, that an arbitrary standard is required (e.g., 24 hours
after release) if there is to be any predictability of results in future litigation and if an insider is to know in advance whether his transaction is in
violation of the law. However, the establishment of such a standard is more
42
in tune with legislative or administrative action than judicial decision.
The SEC also sought relief in the form of a permanent injunction
against the corporate defendant, TGS, restraining it from issuing any
further materially false and misleading publicly distributed informative
items.48 The district court refused to grant the injunction on the ground
that there was no
showing that the purpose of the April 12 press release was to affect
the market price of TGS stock to the advantage of TGS or its insiders,
37. Id. at 3617-18.
38. Id.

39. Id. at 3618 n.18.

40. Id.
41. Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The
Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. RZv. 1271, 1291 (1965).
42. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., No. 30882, 3618 n.18 (2d Cir., Aug. 13, 1968),
petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1968) (No. 533).
43.Villanova
Id. at 3626.
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[therefore] the issuance of the press release did not constitute a violation of Section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 since it was44not issued "in connection with" the purchase or sale of any security.
The district court interpreted the phrase to require that TGS derive some
direct benefit from the issuance of the press release or that the individuals
who prepared it use it to their personal advantage or that its issuance
produce or be intended to produce an unusual market reaction.4 5
The court of appeals concluded that the legislative history of section
10(b) and of rule lOb-5 does not support the limited construction of the
"inconnection with" phrase applied by the trial court. 46 Focusing primarily
on the protection of the public investor, the court of appeals reasoned that
rule 10b-5 is violated whenever statements, reasonably calculated to influence the investing public, are made, if such statements are misleading
or so incomplete as to mislead regardless of the existence of ulterior
motives.47 The issue was remanded to the district court for a determination consistent with the appellate court's standard of whether the press
release was misleading. 48 This broader interpretation of the "in connection
with" phrase of rule lOb-5 is a recognition of the fact that the public suffers
a loss due to a misleading statement regardless of whether the publisher
trades in the market himself. It is the better standard simply because
it is more realistic.
The fifth major issue of a lOb-5 action, and the problem left largely
unanswered in the TGS opinion, is that of the remedies available to injured
investors. The appellate court, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties that
the issue of remedies be deferred pending a final determination of whether
any defendants violated rule lOb-5, 49 remanded the entire issue of remedies
to the trial court.50 The difficulty presented by the remedy issue lies in
the formulation of appropriate relief since the damage caused to the public
cannot easily be repaired. The injunction remedy against the individual
and corporate defendants will serve to punish violators and deter further
violations. The cancellation of stock options and return of profits to the
corporation alleviates, at least to some extent, the corporation's losses.
However, the investing public, goes virtually without a remedy.
44. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)

(emphasis added).

45. Id. at 294.

46. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., No. 30882, 3629 (2d Cir., Aug. 13, 1968),

petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1968) (No. 533). It is
interesting to note that in his dissent Circuit Judge Moore examines the same legislative history and finds that "[tihe legislative history clearly reveals that . . . the
'connection' between the complained of conduct and the securities transaction must be
a closer one than the majority now sanctions." Id. at 3679.
47. Id. at 3634.
48. The court noted that a good faith diligent effort to publish the whole truth
would be a valid defense. Id.
49. Id. at 3590 n.1.
50. This is the first case in which the Commission has requested affirmative relief
to investors. See Kennedy and Wander, Texas Gulf Sulphur: A Most Unusual Case,
20 Bus. LAW. 1057, 1073 (1965).
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The complexity of the market and the diverse and immeasurable effects
of any manipulative or deceptive device add greatly to the problem. The
market being much like a closed system, when one profits wrongfully, it
may be inferred that it is at the expense of other investors. But unlike
face-to-face transactions where the other party is known, a transaction on
an exchange is one with an anonymous "public-at-large." Assuming the
damage could be calculated, the perplexing question remains as to which
investors should be the recipients of any rescission or restitution.
From one point of view, it can be argued that no single investor
actually suffered by an insider's trading. The insider purchased at market
value and the seller was willing to sell at that price without any knowledge
that the insider even existed. It can be further argued that if the insider
had decided to refrain from trading pursuant to rule lOb-5, the seller
nonetheless would have offered his stock for sale at the market price and
probably would have sold it. Hence, the seller would have received the
same price regardless of whether the insider was trading. This argument
would overlook, however, the fact that once an insider elects to trade on
the basis of inside material information, he is subject to rule lOb-5. He is
free to elect either to trade or not, and if he chooses to trade he is under a
duty to disclose material facts. If he makes an adequate disclosure, the
seller may change his mind, either deciding not to sell or insisting on a
higher price. Hence, it is both the insider's presence in the market coupled
with his refusal to disclose which is the proximate cause of the seller's loss.
Although this chain of causation affixes liability, who should recover?
It is possible to gather the names of all those trading in the stock during
the violations and then require the violator to disgorge his profits, which
are then divided among the innocent investors according to the number of
shares they had purchased. However, the pitfall of this remedy is obvious the returned profits would be spread so thinly that no single investor would
begin to recover his loss.
In conclusion, since the instant decision has extended the scope of rule
lOb-5 by expanding the concept of materiality and by applying an extremely
liberal interpretation to the "in connection with" requirement, and since, as
a result, the boundaries of liability have become even hazier, the courts will
be faced with a deluge of similar cases."' This will in turn force the courts
to distinguish and, perhaps, limit TGS, to define precisely the predicates of
liability, and to offer workable guidelines for remedies.
David S. Markson
51. The SEC brought an action against Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., the world's largest brokerage house, charging a lOb-5 violation involving tipoffs
to favored customers to sell shares of Douglas Aircraft Co. on the basis of inside information that Douglas' earnings were going to fall. TIMp, Sept. 6, 1968, at 83-84;
Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
A Penn Central stockholder has filed suit in District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania charging Butcher & Sherrerd, a Philadelphia brokerage firm,
with acting on inside information in selling Penn Central shares when prospects
declined. Phila. Evening Bull., Sept. 7, 1968, at 24, col. 5.
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HOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL -

STANDING NEGRO AND
PUERTO RICAN CITIZENS DISPLACED BY URBAN RENEWAL PROGRAM
HAVE STANDING To ENFORCE THE RELOCATION REQUIREMENTS OF
SECTION 105(c) OF THE HOUSING ACT AND To CLAIM A DENIAL OF
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
RELOCATION PROGRAM.

Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency
(2d Cir. 1968)
Plaintiffs' brought a class action in the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut to enjoin certain local and federal officials,
as well as private developers, from proceeding with the construction of
a moderate income housing project which was part of an urban renewal
program in Norwalk, Connecticut. The Norwalk Redevelopment Agency
entered into a Loan and Capital Grant Contract with the Housing and
Home Finance Agency (HHFA), now the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), under the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954.2
Section 105(c) of the Act conditions the award of federal funds on the
existence of a community program to relocate displaced site families
according to the standards set forth in that section. 3
The complaint alleged that in planning and implementing the program,
the Agency did not assure, as required by the contract, adequate relocation
for Negro and Puerto Rican displacees to the same extent that it did for
whites, that the Agency knew there was rampant discrimination in the
private housing market, and while white displacees could obtain hous1. Norwalk, Connecticut chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality, two nonprofit tenants' associations comprised of low income Negroes and Puerto Ricans, one
representing former residents of the project area, and the other representing those
living outside the project area, and eight individuals representing four classes: (1)
those still occuping homes within the project area; (2) those whose homes in the
project area were demolished and who now occupy "overcrowded" rental units outside the project area but within the city of Norwalk; (3) those whose homes in the
project area were demolished and who now occupy rental units "at excessive rentals"
outside the project area but within the city of Norwalk; and (4) those who formerly
lived in Norwalk, but "by virtue of the acts of defendants" now occupy rental units
outside of the city.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-60 (Supp. 1967).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (Supp. 1967) provides in relevant part:
Contracts for loans or capital grants shall be made only with a duly authorized
local public agency and shall require that (c) (1) There shall be a feasible method for the temporary relocation of individuals and families displaced from the urban renewal area, and there are or
are being provided, in the urban renewal area or in other areas not generally less
desirable in regard to public utilities and public and commercial facilities and at
rents or prices within the financial means of the individuals and families displaced
from the urban renewal area, decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings equal in number
to the number of and available to such displaced individuals and families and
reasonably accessible to their places of employment.
This section's coverage was extended to displaced individuals by the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1965, but that extension does not apply to this project.
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, PUB. L. No. 89-117, § 305(c), 79 Stat.
476. The plaintiffs in this case all represented displaced families.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/7

34

Editors: Recent Developments
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

ing, Negroes and Puerto Ricans were forced either to pay exorbitant
rentals or leave the city. The plaintiffs made two claims based upon the
foregoing allegations: (1) that they had been denied equal protection of
the law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment 4 and (2) that the defendant had acted in violation of section 105 (c) of the Housing Act.
The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that this
was not a proper class action and, even assuming it was, plaintiffs had no
standing under the Housing Act to challenge the planning or implementation of an urban renewal project, and that the mere allegation of civil
rights violations will not confer standing to raise a constitutional argument. 5 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the complaint stated both constitutional and statutory
claims on which relief could be granted, that the individual plaintiffs had
standing to make the claims, and that the action was properly brought as
a class action. 6 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
In the only three cases which have heretofore dealt with displacee
standing under section 105(c), the federal courts, under the rubric of
"lack of standing," have effectively barred private citizens from challenging
the relocation plans of an urban renewal program. 7 Two reasons have
8
been espoused by those courts for this denial. In Green St. Ass'n v. Daley,
the most recent case prior to Norwalk to deal with this issue, the Seventh
Circuit, relying on its prior decision in Harrison-Halsted Community
Group, Inc. v. HHFA,9 denied standing on the ground that the provisions
of the Housing Act did not confer "private legal rights" on displacees.
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, in Johnson v. Redevelopment
Agency' 0 based its denial, at least partially, on the theory that Congress
did not intend section 105 (c) "to give a right of action to those not a party to
the contract between the Redevelopment Agency and the United States."'"
In none of these cases was the issue of displacee standing with regard
to a constitutional claim of deprivation of equal protection of the law
decided. Although the complaint in Green St. raised this issue, the court

4. "No State shall ...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNs'T. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 42 F.R.D. 617 (D.
Conn. 1967).
6. The district court's holding that this was not a proper class action under Fz.
R. Civ. P. 23 was reversed as to the individual plaintiffs but not decided with respect
to the association plaintiffs. The class action aspect of this case will not be discussed
in this Note.
7. Green St. Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932
(1967) ; Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 915 (1963) ; Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. HHFA, 310 F.2d
99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963)
8. 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932 (1967).
9. 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
10. 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963).
11. Id. at 874. But cf. Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967) (obligations of recipients of federal funds
were enforced by third party beneficiaries).
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denied standing under section 105(c) and did not consider the constitutional argument. Harrison-Halsted did not involve an equal protection
claim, and in Johnson, while constitutional claims were alleged initially, on
appeal the issues were narrowed to whether the defendant was carrying
out a feasible plan of relocation as required by section 105 (c). In Norwalk,
a federal court of appeals, for the first time, granted standing to displacees to raise a constitutional claim of denial of equal protection of the
law in the relocation plans of an urban renewal program.
In order to comply with the constitutional restriction on federal court
jurisdiction that legal issues be presented within the framework of a "case"
or "controvery," the courts must find that the plaintiff has standing to
sue and that the issue to be resolved is a justiciable one.1 2 In determining
the issue of standing, which focuses on the status of a party, 18 the courts
have held that a plaintiff must have a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy before they will entertain his suit. 1 4 Moreover, even though

a party may have a personal stake, if the right he is attempting to assert
is not one recognized by the courts, he will be denied standing. 15 The
Norwalk court, applying these traditional criteria, 16 found little difficulty
in holding that the plaintiffs had established standing to raise their equal
protection claim. The court reasoned that since plaintiffs' houses were
razed without provision for adequate relocation facilities, their stake in
the outcome of the case was immediate and personal, and further concluded
that the right which they alleged had been violated, the right not
to be subject to racial discrimination in government programs, was within
the protection of the courts.
With respect to the issue of whether the plaintiffs had presented a
justiciable question, the court similarly had little difficulty finding in their
favor. The concept of justiciability, as distinguished from the concept of standing, 7 centers on whether the question presented is one
12.
13.
14.
15.

See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
See note 17 infra.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
For example, it is well established that injury through economic competition

is generally not a sufficient basis for standing to sue. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,
302 U.S. 464 (1938) ; Berry v. HHFA, 340 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964) ; Pittsburgh
Hotels Ass'n v. Urban Redevelopment Authority, 309 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 273 U.S. 916 (1963) ; Taft Hotel Corp. v. HHFA, 262 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 967 (1959); Allied-City Wide v. Cole, 230 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1956); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). But cf. pp. 152-53 infra where one may have standing based on competitive interest when it is provided by statute. FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
16. The court relied on Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ; Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S.
288 (1944); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). With respect to the
Frothingham case see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
17. The Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) recognized that
the distinction has not always appeared with clarity in its prior cases. The Court
defined the concepts as follows: "[W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the
question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to
request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is
justiciable." Id. at 99-100.
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the courts can or should attempt to adjudicate.' 8

If the court were

confronted with a challenge to the basic validity of an urban renewal plan,' 9
it might then be faced with a nonjusticiable political question.2 0 In
Norwalk, however, the court narrowly framed the issue so that the plaintiffs'
constitutional claim was that the standard for relocation was being met
less sufficiently for Negroes and Puerto Ricans than it was for whites.
By viewing the plaintiffs' complaint in this way, the court was confronted
with a justiciable question.
In resolving whether the plaintiffs had standing to raise their statutory
claims, the Norwalk court relied on the recent Supreme Court case of
22
2I
Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardner and on the legislative history of the Act.
The court reasoned that Congress intended to protect the specific interests
of displacees when it enacted the relocation provision, and that since there
28
was no persuasive reason to believe it intended to cut off judicial review,

plaintiffs had standing.
Case law has established a presumption of a right to judicial review
in persons whose interests are "acutely and immediately" affected by
administrative action. 24 The Supreme Court has consistently held that
standing to challenge administrative action exists where a statute is enacted to protect a competitive interest and where the party sharing that
interest alleges its disregard by the agency.' 8 Since the courts have
18. E.g., Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923); Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (advisory opinion); California v. San Pablo &
T. R.R., 149 U.S. 308 (1893) (moot questions) ; Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
1 (1848) (political questions).
19. In Green St., in addition to challenging the relocation plan, the plaintiffs
sought to enjoin acquisitions which were part of the urban renewal plan. This, in
effect, was a challenge to the whole program. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the
complaint on the ground that any taking of land under the eminent domain power
which is ostensibly for a public purpose, even though violations of federal rights are
claimed, is a matter for state courts except in the most unusual circumstances. 372
F.2d at 7. But see 81 HARV. L. Riv. 1568 (1968). However, as the Norwalk court
pointed out, the Seventh Circuit's discussion of the issue "implies that it harbored
some doubt as to the justiciability of the issues .... " 395 F.2d at 928.
20. The Norwalk court noted that an overall challenge of this type was considered on the merits in Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179
(6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968).
21. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Mr. Justice Harlan stated: "[J]udicial review of a final
agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive
reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress." Id. at 140.
22. S. Rzp. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1949). It is stated therein:
The bill sets up adequate safeguards against any undue hardship resulting from
the undertaking of slum clearance under current conditions. It requires, first,
that no slum-clearance project shall be undertaken by a local public agency unless
there is a feasible means for the temporary relocation of the families to be displaced, and unless adequate permanent housing is available or is being made
available to them.
23. It may be argued that since Congress has explicitly given HUD authority to
make moving expense determinations nonreviewable, Housing Act of 1949, § 114(d),
42 U.S.C. § 1465(d) (Supp. 1967), if it intended to make the 105(c) finding also
nonreviewable, it would have written a similar provision into the Act. See Comment,
Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966, 972
n.28 (1968).
24. See L. JA1Fr, JUDICIAL CONTROL OP ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION 336-63 (1965).
See also 4 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 28.21 (Supp. 1965).
25. Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) ; Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) ; Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924).
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recognized that a competitive interest when protected by statute is sufficient to support standing to challenge an administrative action, the interest
of displacees in decent, safe, and sanitary relocation housing would seem
to be no less compelling. Although it could be argued that while Congress
enacted section 105(c) to protect displacees, it intended to entrust HUD
with the sole responsibility of enforcing their rights, the well settled rule
which establishes a presumption of judicial review would seem to rebut
this argument.
Moreover, the cases of Gart v. Cole26 and Merge v. Sharott27 provide
precedents which justify the court's grant of standing under the Housing
Act. In Gart standing was granted to plaintiffs to contest the procedures
adopted by the HHFA Administrator under section 101 (c) of the same
Housing Act 28 and in Merge, the court held that displaced businessmen
had standing to sue to recover relocation compensation under section 114
of the Act. 29 The fact that members of the business community have
standing in the federal courts under the Housing Act to protect their
financial interest when threatened by relocation is strong support for the
court's holding that Negro and Puerto Rican displacees have standing
under the same Act to protect their right to a decent home.
The court's decision is further supported by the legislative history of
the Housing Act3" and the continued strengthening of its relocation provisiona1 which seem to clearly import that Congress intended to protect
the specific interests of the displacees. In addition, the congressional
declaration of national housing policy explicitly states that the central goal
of the Housing Act is "a decent home and a suitable living environment
for every American family," 32 while section 105(c) specifically guarantees
"decent, safe, and sanitary" rehousing to displaced families. 3 These
26. 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
27. 341 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1965).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1451 (c) (1964). This section was amended and today is a nondelegable function of the Assistant Secretary for Renewal and Housing Assistance.
31 Fed. Reg. 8964-65 (1966). The plaintiffs in Gart had alleged that the HHFA
administrator improperly delegated his duty to review the feasibility of the project's
relocation provisions. 263 F.2d at 251.
29. 341 F.2d at 994. 42 U.S.C. § 1465(b) (1964), provides in relevant part:
"A local public agency may pay to any displaced business concern or nonprofit organization ...

its reasonable and necessary moving expenses ...."

30. See note 22 supra.
31. The 1964 amendments broadened the coverage to include individuals as well
as families and required that each community establish a special relocation assistance
program to minimize the hardships of displacement. Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-560, § 305, 78 Stat. 786. See also Note, Protecting the Standing of Renewal
Site Families to Seek Review of Community Relocation Planning, 73 YALt L.J. 1080,

1081 (1964). In 1965, the requirements of careful planning were further elaborated
and as a condition for further assistance, reassurances that relocation housing would
be available were required from localities carrying out urban renewal programs. 42
U.S.C. § 1455(c) (2) (Supp. I, 1965). In 1966, an amendment that the redevelopment
of the urban renewal area (unless such redevelopment is for predominantly nonresidential uses) will provide for a substantial number of standard housing of low
and moderate cost to serve poor and disadvantaged people was enacted. 42 U.S.C.
q 1455(f) (Supp. 1967).
32. Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
33. See note 3 supra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/7
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espoused goals seem to dictate that the courts should grant standing to displacees so that the rights afforded them by the Act may be effectuated.
34
It is submitted that the three cases relied on by the district court
to deny standing were wrongly decided to the extent that they are inconsistent with the instant decision. While it has been suggested that the
Johnson case need not be read to preclude judicial review of agency action
under section 105 (c), 35 there seems to be no support for its statement
that Congress did not intend to give displacees "a right of action." 3 6 The
Green St. court relied on Harrison-Halstedas precedent to deny standing
under section 105(c). It would appear that reliance on the latter case
was misplaced, since the main focus in Harrison-Halsted was on the
particular plaintiffs who made the challenge rather than on the availability
of review under the Housing Act. The plaintiffs had objected to a revised
urban renewal plan, claiming they would suffer economic injury as a result
of the revision. The Harrison-Halsted court held that it did not appear
that any of the plaintiffs' "private legal rights" had been violated. This
holding, that injury through economic competition is not generally a
37
sufficient basis for standing to sue, is a well established proposition.
But, as the Norwalk court pointed out, "none of those cases [relied on
by Harrison-Halsted] supports a holding that displacees have no standing
to seek judicial review of agency action under section 105(c)."38
Since some aspects of urban renewal programs will be subject to
judicial review, an important ramification of the instant decision will
be a more stringent enforcement of section 105(c). This effect may be
limited, however, because courts may be hesitant to become involved in
an area not within their traditional functions. The defendants in Norwalk
had contended that plaintiffs' claim was nonjusticiable, as it would involve
the courts in overall urban renewal planning and inevitably in the resolution of questions which are ultimately political. The Norwalk court recognized that courts, due to the political implications,39 have been generally
reluctant to interfere with urban renewal planning and conceded the necessity of discretionary decisionmaking in this area. However, the court
also firmly stated that courts should not abdicate their responsibility to
34. Cases cited note 7 supra. It should be noted that since the Housing Act con-

tains no review provisions, the right to review in Green St. and Harrison-Halsted
was claimed under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), now
chapter 7 of title 5 of the U.S. Code. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-06 (Supp. II, 1965-66). It has been suggested that a court granting standing
under section 105(c) of the Housing Act would conform to the purpose of APA
section 10 which is said to codify the presumption in favor of judicial review.
See Comment, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALF
L.J. 966, 973 (1968).
35. See Note, Protecting the Standing of Renewal Site Families to Seek Review
of Community Relocation Planning, 73 YALE L.J. 1080 (1964).
36. Johnson v. Redevolpment Agency, 317 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 915 (1963). See notes 11 & 23 supra.
37. See cases cited note 15 supra.
38. 395 F.2d at 935.
39.Villanova
See note
19 supra.
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protect site displacees from infringement of their constitutional rights. Thus
the court advocated a middle position by stating:
Case-by-case inquiry is necessary, with due regard for the need
for judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
problems to be undertaken, and with recognition of the role played by
the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government in the planning
40
and implementation of urban renewal.
To foreclose access to federal courts when citizens claim a denial of constitutional rights simply because the area in which defendants have acted
is normally not subject to judicial review would be inconsistent with a long
line of decisions. 4

1

In view of the court's narrow holding, which limits

review to insuring that the standard for relocation is met equally for all
citizens, white as well as nonwhite, the instant decision, while affording citizens a means of protecting constitutionally guaranteed rights, need not in42
volve the courts in the political question of overall urban renewal planning.
The Norwalk decision has also raised a question as to the form of
relief that should be granted if the plaintiffs have in fact been denied equal
protection or if their rights under section 105(c) of the Act have been
violated. While the Norwalk court was not willing to speculate on the
appropriate remedy, it did rule out the affirmative form of relief requested
by plaintiffs - an order requiring construction of low-income housing
under court supervision - as it would involve the courts in areas foreign
to their experience and competence. In addition the court was careful to
point out that the standard for relocation is not for the courts to establish;
the standard has been set by Congress, and HUD was entrusted with the
primary responsibility of enforcing it. If, as was suggested by the Norwalk
court, the courts required proof that the relocation standards were being
met as adequately for nonwhite as they were for whites before permitting
the project to proceed, they would be applying the appropriate form of
relief in cases of this kind. However, it is possible that other courts, faced
with the task of approving complex programs of relocation as part of the
remedy, might classify the issue as nonjusticiable.
A further consequence of Norwalk may be a temporary curtailment
of urban renewal activities because of the availability of limited judicial
review of urban redevelopment and because as a possible remedy the courts
may require proof of adequate relocation before allowing the program to
proceed. It would appear, however, that such temporary curtailment is
justified if it is necessary to insure displacees of adequate relocation building. As the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations concluded
40. 395 F.2d at 929.
41. E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (education) ; Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (education); Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 220 F.2d
386 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches and bathhouses) ; Anderson v.
Courson, 203 F. Supp. 806 (M.D. Ga. 1962) (voting places and lists).
42. The existence of judicial review inevitably increases the potential for
"harassing" suits which could unnecessarily interfere with urban renewal programs.
Most of these suits, however, could be disposed of by summary judgment. FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(c), 56.
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after a thorough study of the relocation problem: "[T]he Commission
believes the goal of providing standard housing for all is of such. preeminent importance that its availability should be assured even if it means
43
a delay in a federally aided project."
It is submitted that no distortion of existing law is necessary to
establish that plaintiffs have standing, both to raise their constitutional claim
and to enforce the relocation provisions under section 105(c) of the
Housing Act. A court which refused to intervene in the administration of
section 105(c) would be abdicating its traditional responsibility to insure
that administrative action is confined within the bounds of agency discretion and authority. Moreover, the court's decision is a step towards insuring the implementation of a congressional edict - decent, safe, and sanitary
dwellings for site displacees. The "threat" of judicial review of its activities should insure that HUD, which has the expertise to initially ascertain
the adequacy of local relocation plans, will properly protect the interest
of site families.
Andr6 G. Sassoon

LABOR LAW
APPROVES

-

LOCKOUTS -

OFFENSIVE USE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
OF LOCKOUT

BY

SINGLE

EMPLOYER

IN

PRE-IMPASSE SITUATION.

Darling & Co. (N.L.R.B. 1968)
The respondent is a manufacturer, seller, and distributor of fertilizers,
and makes 70 percent of its annual shipments between March and May.
The company's production employees were represented in negotiations for
a new contract by the International Chemical Workers Union, Local 127.
Although the expiration date of the then effective contract was December
1, 1965, the employees continued working beyond this date. In the course
of negotiations, the union received a copy of a medical plan proposed by
the company, and the union representatives requested a 7- to 10-day analysis
period. During the analysis period, respondent, citing an impasse in negotiations, locked out' the production employees.
At the hearing before the trial examiner, the company asserted two
different reasons for the lockout: (1) to apply economic pressure on employees to encourage them to accede to company proposals and (2) to
avert the repetition of a strike which occurred during its 1962 shipping
season. The trial examiner concluded that the absence of an impasse ren43. U.S.

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RELOCATION:

UNEQUAL TREATMENT OV PEOPLE AND BUSINESSES

DISPLACED BY GOVERNMENTS 116

(1965).
1. While not statutorily defined, a lockout is a temporary layoff of some or
all employees when work is available to apply economic pressure in order to gain
accedence to company proposals. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,
301 (1965).
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dered the Supreme Court's decision in American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB2
inapplicable and, therefore, the prior decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, which held that absent special circumstances an employer
may not lockout in support of his bargaining position, were controlling.3
Under these decisions, a lockout was held to violate labor's guaranteed
rights under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 4 and thus to
constitute a violation of sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act. 5
The National Labor Relations Board reversed the trial examiner,
holding: (1) that the test of the legality of a lockout, as enunciated in
American Ship and applied in Evening News Ass'n,6 is applicable to a
pre-impasse lockout; (2) that there was no specific evidence of unlawful
anti-union animus, the purposes of the lockout being those cited at the
hearing; and (3) that the lockout was not inherently prejudicial to union
interests and not devoid of significant economic justification and, therefore,
specific evidence of anti-union intent was necessary. Darling & Co., 171
N.L.R.B. No. 95, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (68 L.R.R.M.) 1133 (May 23, 1968).
Prior to American Ship, the general position of the National Labor
Relations Board was that lockouts constituted prima facie unfair labor
practices which violated sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the National Labor
Relations Act. 7 The Board, however, recognized the right to lockout in two
situations: (1) defensively, as a means to combat unlawful union activity ;8
and (2) when the employer, in the face of an imminent strike, was acting
to avert a special or unusual loss not consonant with an ordinary strike.9
2. 380 U.S. 300 (1965). The Court limited its holding to
a temporary layoff of employees [used] solely as a means to bring economic

pressure to bear in support of the employer's bargaining position, after an impasse
has been reached. This is the only issue before us, and all that we decide.

Id. at 308 (emphasis added).

3. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 473 (1960); Quaker State Oil
Refining Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 334 (1958); American Brake Shoe Co., 116 N.L.R.B.
820 (1956) ; Spalding Avery Lumber Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1516 (1953).
4. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
5. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ....
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1) (3) (1964).
6. 166 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 65 L.R.R.M. 1425 (June 29, 1967). The outcome of the
Board's review of the trial examiners findings was predictable in light of Evening
News Ass'n, which was decided subsequent to the issuance of the trial examiner's
decision and which held that the American Ship test of the legality of a lockout was
applicable to a deadlock situation. The Board stated in Evening News Ass'n that:
[T]he legality of any lockout must be determined with regard to the criteria laid
down by the Supreme Court. American Ship cautions against the promulgation of
any hard and fast rule for determining whether a particular lockout is lawful ....
Id. at 1427.
7. See cases cited note 3 supra.
8. Link Belt, 26 N.L.R.B. 227 (1940) (retaliation against a sit-down strike).
9. Building Contractors Ass'n, 138 N.L.R.B. 1405 (1962) (employers could
not assure customers of work completion once started, thus the stoppage would not
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The basis of the Board's general position was its assumption of the power
to balance economic weapons in the bargaining process. In assessing the relative economic powers of the parties, the Board made the general determination that a lockout, used offensively, was prejudicial to union interests
and prima facie violative of sections 8(a) (1) and (3).10 Only when the
lockout was utilized in circumstances embodied in the exceptions was it
considered a defensive weapon and thus permissible employer activity.
The Supreme Court" and legal commentators' 2 decried the Board's
pre-American Ship position as a failure to discern the difference between
economic interests and anti-union animus and activity.' 3 They further
reasoned that the legality of a lockout, at least in some instances, could be
inferred from the deletion in the enacted version of the National Labor
Relations Act of a section of the draft which proscribed lockouts 1 4 as well

as from the explicit mention of lockouts in the Labor-Management Relations Act. 15 Moreover, in several decisions, one involving a lockout, the
Supreme Court rejected the Board's arbitration of economic weapons. 16
In American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 1 the Court again refuted the
Board's assumed power to act as arbiter of the economic weapons available
to the parties of a labor dispute.' 8 The primary purpose of the Labor Acts
was to redress the imbalance of economic power between labor and manonly involve serious economic loss to employers but could be dangerous to the lives,
safety, and welfare of the public) ; Betts Cadillac, Olds., Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951)
(Board justified a lockout because strike would halt work on customers' cars brought
in for repair) ; In re Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943) (lockout permitted to avoid peculiar economic loss-spoilage).
In NLRB v. Teamsters Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957), the Supreme Court
affirmed the Board's decision in Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954),
which established a third exception when members of a multi-employer association
locked out to frustrate the effects of a whipsaw strike.
10. The Board believed that management's arsenal of economic weapons was
sufficient and refused to grant it the additional bargaining power which is commensurate with the right to lockout. The Board did, however, recognize the rights of
management to make agreements with union representatives, hire permanent replacements after a strike, and provide for the production of its product elsewhere. NLRB
v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); American Brake Shoe Co., 116
N.L.R.B. 820, 832 (1956).
11. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 315 (1965).
12. Meltzer, Lockouts Under the LMRA: Kew Shadows on an Old Terrain,
28 U. CHI. L. Rgv. 614 (1961); Meltzer, Single-Employer and Multi-Employer
Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 24 U. CHi. L. Rxv. 70, 81 (1956) ; Petro, The
NLRB on Lockouts-I, 3 LAB. L.J. 659 (1952) ; 73 HARv. L. REV. 787, 789 (1960)
37 N.Y.U.L. R-v. 1152 (1962).
13. This polemic was also evidenced among the courts of appeal which adopted
conflicting positions. Compare Utah Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n v.
NLRB, 294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961) and Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. NLRB,
270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959), with NLRB v. Dalton Brick and Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886
(5th Cir. 1962).
14. S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(1) (1935).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (4) (1964) (for a 60-day period before termination of
the contract, the contract terms are to continue in full force and effect, without
resorting to strike or lockout); id. § 173(c) (conciliation service to induce parties
to settle without resort to strike or lockout) ; id. § 176 (President can act when
threatened or actual strike or lockout effects substantial part of industry) ; id. § 178 (a)
(conditions permitting district court to enjoin such strike or lockout).
16. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 292 (1965); NLRB v. International Union
of Ins. Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 497-98 (1960).
17. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
18. Id. at 317.
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agement. 19 It was Congress' intention that the perceived imbalance of
bargaining power was corrected by the enumeration of certain rights of
labor and the proscription of activities by management which in the past
had interfere with employees' self-organization and the collective bargaining process. The duty to enforce labor's rights under section 7 of the
Act was delegated to the Board. The Court summarized the Board's role
when it stated:
Sections 8(a) (1) and (3) do not give the Board a general authority
to assess the relative economic power of the adversaries in the bargaining process and to deny weapons to one party or the other because of
its assessment of that party's bargaining power. 20
The criterion to determine a violation of the Act was not whether a lockout
would mean additional bargaining power for management, but whether the
use of the power would infringe upon the rights of labor to a degree not
countenanced by Congress.
The Court's decision in American Ship is a recognition that legislation neither guarantees labor victories nor insures that labor's position will
be free of economic disadvantages. 21 Section 8(a) (1) refers to interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under
section 7 and is not a blanket proscription of such acts. In addition, section
8(a) (3) does not proscribe all acts which tend to discriminate against
union interests. Although the Court recognized that a lockout might tend
to discourage or encourage membership in labor organizations,2 2 it also
recognized the legitimate business interests which management sought to
protect. The Court therefore rejected the Board's general view with respect
to lockouts as too narrow an interpretation of the guidelines set forth by
Congress to effectuate the policy of the Acts in sections 7, 8(a) (1) and (3).
To assist the Board in future determinations, the Court clearly indicated the factors it considered germane to a finding that a lockout is not
an unfair labor practice. Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority,
stated that under the circumstances the factors are whether the lockout is
"[1] inherently so prejudicial to union interests and [2] so devoid of
significant economic justification that [3] no specific evidence of .
23
union animus is required.

. .

anti-

While the Court in American Ship was careful to limit its holding to
the facts which were before it, a post-impasse lockout, the considerations
19. Id. at 316. The purpose and policy of the Acts are to "eliminate those
obstructions" to the free flow of commerce "by encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self organization .
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
20. 380 U.S. at 317.
21. Id. at 310.
In NLRB v. Teamsters Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957), the Court stated
that the protection afforded employees by the acts "[is not so absolute as to deny
self-help by employers when legitimate interests of employees and employers collide."
Id. at 96. See Meltzer, Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows on an Old Terrain,
28 U. CHi. L. R~v. 614 (1961) ; Petro, The NLRB on Lockouts - II, 3 LAB. L.J. 739,
801 (1952).
22. 380 U.S. at 312.
23. Id. at 311.
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which the Court employed in its test to determine the legality of a lockout
appeared to the Board, in the instant case, to be readily applicable and
equally compelling in other lockout situations.2 4 The Board's adoption of
this position is in direct contrast to their previous view that employment of
a lockout constitutes a prima facie unfair labor practice and marks a partial
withdrawal of the Board from its active role in the bargaining process. The
Board continued its broad application of American Ship based on the fact
that that case did not set forth a strict and inflexible rule for determining
whether a particular lockout was lawful. The absence of an impasse does
nrot render American Ship per se inapplicable but is "one of all the surround25
ing circumstances" in determining the legality of a pre-impasse lockout.
The Board's change of position is made particularly evident by Darling
because the Board extended the application of the test to a preimpasse lockout when it could have found that there was a threat of imminent strike and that unusual economic loss not consonant with an ordinary
strike would have resulted, 26 thereby placing the case within a traditional
27
exception to its decisions prior to American Ship.
In applying American Ship to the pre-impasse lockout, the Board held
that such a lockout is not inherently prejudicial to such essential union
interests as the right to meaningful collective bargaining and the right to
engage in concerted activity. The Board found that Darling and Company's sole purpose in locking out the production employees was to protect
its direct and legitimate business interests and secure modification of union
demands. Justice Stewart, in writing the majority opinion in American
Ship, referred to the intention of the company to secure modification
of demands and acknowledged that "we cannot see that this intention is in
any way inconsistent with the employees' rights to bargain collectively." 28
The same purpose prior to an impasse in contract negotiations is no
more inherently prejudicial to the right to effectively and meaningfully
bargain collectively than it is after an impasse. During the lockout union
representatives remain free to negotiate in good faith with the employer.
Moreover, the door to good faith negotiations must remain open: the employer's use of a pre-impasse lockout as a pretense to evade the collective
bargaining process would clearly result in a violation of section 8(a) (5).29
Since the door to good faith negotiations is thus statutorily guaranteed,
any impairment of the union's interest in collective bargaining will not be
of such a degree as to be inherently prejudicial.
24. See Evening News Ass'n, 166 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 65 L.R.R.M. 1425 (June 29,
1967) (the Board characterized the negotiations as deadlocked) ; cf. Acme Markets,
Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1452 (1966).
25. Darling & Co., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 2 LAB. R&. Rip. (68 L.R.R.M.) 1133,
1135 (May 23, 1968).
26. The union had communicated its intent to strike at its convenience and the
1962 strike during Darling and Company's shipping season caused extraordinary loss.
27. See cases cited note 9 supra.
28. 380 U.S. at 309.
29. Interrelated with sections 8(a) (1) and (3) is the statutory obligation of the
employer to bargain in good faith. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees ...." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
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Moreover, a pre-impasse lockout does not render the right to engage
in concerted activity - the right to strike - a useless and meaningless
economic weapon. Until the lockout is effected, the threat of a strike remains
a real and forceful bargaining lever. Once the contract has terminated,
a, post- or pre-impasse lockout entails a work stoppage similar to that
initiated by the employees in a strike. The real issue is who will have the
power to determine the timing of the work stoppage. To grant labor the
exclusive right to determine the timing of stoppage would permit unions
to stall the bargaining process until the employer was susceptible to the
greatest economic harm.30 Since the Act sought to redress the inequality
of bargaining power, to arm labor with this power would leave the employer at a definite disadvantage with no countervailing weapon, and thereby
foster inequality. There is no statutory provision which guarantees labor's
right to determine the timing of work stoppage or which guarantees a position free from economic disadvantage. 8 ' A lockout, pre- or post-impasse,
merely permits management a voice in the timing of the work stoppage.
It would appear that a pre-impasse lockout is no more inherently
prejudicial to union interests than the hiring of permanent replacements
2
for striking workers which has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court.
8
The exercise of labor's statutory right to strike jeopardizes their relationship with the employer who is not obligated to rehire the strikers if
all positions are occupied by replacements. A lockout, in contrast, is merely
a temporary discontinuation of employment and is thus less prejudicial
to union interests. Therefore, a temporary severance of employment is
not a rejection of the basic principles of the Act and does not flaunt its
basic purpose - to alleviate strife by redressing the inequality of bargaining power.
American Ship requires the employer to show that his decision
to lockout was motivated by significant economic justification. This
justification consists of a real and direct interest in negotiations which will
have a definite impact upon the employer's future business relations with

30. The act of stalling is inimical to the bargaining process and, standing alone,
would be very difficult to detect. To eliminate activities by labor organizations, officers,

and members which burdened and obstructed commerce, the Labor-Management Relations Act enumerated certain unfair labor practices of labor. Section 8(b) (3) makes
it an unfair labor practice "to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer .
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1964).
31. In NLRB v. Teamsters Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957), the Court recognized
that the protection of the right to strike is not so absolute as to deny self-help to
employer when the legitimate interests of the parties collide. Id. at 96. See American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 313 (1965) (Act does not immunize employees from the economic disadvantages attendant to a bargaining dispute).
32. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
33. The Labor-Management Relations Act provides: "Employees shall have the

right to .
ing . . .

.
.

engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964); "[n]othing in this subchapter, except as

specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or

impede or diminish in any way the right to strike .

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/7

. . ."

29 U.S.C. § 163 (1964).

46

Editors: Recent Developments
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

his employees. 34 An employer's interest is no less significant, and is perhaps
greater, in a pre-impasse lockout. In the instant case, Darling and Company was immediately involved in negotiations and any lengthy delay in
reaching a settlement would place the company at a definite disadvantage
with employees poised to strike during the heart of its shipping season. In
the light of past work stoppages and the union's notice that it would strike
at its convenience, Darling and Company was legitimately concerned over
the timing of work stoppage and was justified in applying economic pressure
to gain acceptance of its own proposals. Hence, the Board found significant
economic justification for the lockout.
When no significant economic justification is shown, the Supreme
Court, in Great Dane Trailers, Inc.35 and Fleetwood Trailer Co.80 has
held that the employer's activity is an unfair labor practice regardless of
the presence or absence of anti-union animus. In light of these cases, it
is virtually inconceivable that employers charged with violations of the
Act will not allege some economic justification for a lockout.
Since the pre-impasse lockout in Darling & Co. created no inherent
prejudice and significant economic justification was found to exist, the
conduct was prima facie lawful 3 7 and evidence of anti-union animus was

necessary to substantiate the allegation that the lockout constituted 8(a) (1)
and (3) violations. Anti-union animus may be proved either by specific
evidence or by inference from the employer's activities. Since employersare not likely to leave records or other proof indicating such motive, improper motive is seldom capable of specific proof. Thus the determinative
issue most often will be whether an inference of unlawful intent may be'
drawn from the employer's activities. Once significant justification is established, however, the majority in NLRB v. Brown"8 and American Ship
require a great degree of evidence to overcome the presumption of lawfulness. The Court in Brown stated that the inference of unlawful intent
must be the only reasonable inference 3 9 and American Ship referred to an
inference "so compelling that it is justifiable to disbelieve the employer's
protestations of innocent purpose. 4 0 In contrast to a simple weighing of

34. Evening News Ass'n, 166 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 65 L.R.R.M. 1425, 1427 (June 29,
1967); Acme Markets, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1452 (1966) (owner of unionized stores
which were members of multi-employer unit locked out his non-union, non-member
stores doing business in close proximity to unit members to protect multi-employer
association interests) ; Friedland Painting Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 571 (1966) (amount of
work to be performed in an area was speculative, therefore interests held indirect).
35. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
36. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
37. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967); NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 289 (1965).

38. 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
39. Id. at 287.
40. 380 U.S. at 311-12.
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interests,41 this represents a "thumb on the scales" approach to deciding
42
the legality of a lockout.
The Board in Darling & Co. found no specific evidence of anti-union
animus. Moreover, in light of the Board's explicit assertion that the
lockout was not inherently prejudicial and its finding of significant economic
justification, it found that it could not infer unlawful intent.
In the final analysis, by establishing the standards of American Ship,
the Court has deprived the Board of a great degree of flexibility and established for itself and the Board a new standard by which to measure the
legality of a lockout. Despite the explicit statutory protection accorded a
strike and the fact that a lockout does not enjoy a similar position, the Supreme Court and the Board have added a post- and pre-impasse lockout,
respectively, to the employer's arsenal of economic weapons. In response to
the Court's mandate in American Ship, the Board has withdrawn from its
prior position as the party who dominated the bargaining process, because it
acted as an arbiter of economic weapons, and has assumed its proper function of enforcing labor's guaranteed rights under section 7. It is unlikely
that the courts will restrict the test of the legality of a lockout to the narrow
factual situation posed in American Ship. In light of Darling & Co., it is
foreseeable, if not already a reality, that a lockout in support of legitimate
business interests, absent specific proof of anti-union animus, will be an
economic correlative to a strike.
Stephen A. McBride

TAXATION

-

DISTRIBUTION

OF

STOCK

-

SECTION

355

OF

THE

INTERNAL REVENUE CODE IS CONSTRUED WHERE SUCCESSIVE DisTRIBUTIONS OF STOCK RIGHTS ARE MADE TO CORPORATE SHAREHOLDERS PURSUANT TO A SPIN-OFF.

Commissioner v. Gordon (U.S. 1968)
Taxpayers Gordon and Baan, residents of New York and California
respectively, were stockholders in Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company (hereinafter Pacific), a subsidiary of American Telephone and Tele41. It is interesting to note the apparent division among Supreme Court Justices
with respect to the degree of proof required to infer anti-union animus. In contrast
to the Brown and American Ship approach, Mr. Justice White's majority opinion in
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), and his concurring opinion in
American Ship expound a simple weighing of interests test.
[Plreferring one motive to another is in reality the . . . delicate task . . . of
weighing the interests of employees in concerted activity against the interest of
the employer in operating his business . . . and of balancing in the light of the
Act and its policy the intended consequences upon employee rights against the
business ends to be served by the employer's conduct.
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1963). Mr. Justice Goldberg,
concurring in American Ship, also postulated the simple balancing test as the proper
test and the one traditionaly adhered to by the Court. American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 339 (1965).
42. Christensen and Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair
Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALn L.J. 1269,
1326 (1968).
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graph Company. Pacific provided telephone service in California, Idaho,
Oregon, and Washington and, for business reasons, decided to divide its
operations into two corporations. Northwest Bell Telephone Company
(hereinafter Northwest) was therefore created in accordance with a Pacific
distribution plan to take over Pacific's non-California operations.' Under
this spin-off plan Pacific transferred its Washington, Oregon, and Idaho
assets to Northwest which assumed Pacific's liabilities arising out of Pacific's operations in those States. In exchange, Pacific received all of Northwest's stock and Northwest's demand note for $200 million. Also pursuant
to this plan, Pacific stockholders were to receive stock rights on the basis of
their ownership in Pacific which would allow them to purchase the stock of
Northwest.2 In 1961, Pacific distributed stock rights representing 57 percent of the total Northwest shares to its shareholders. Six rights plus $16
entitled each Pacific shareholder to receive one Northwest share. Two
years later, in 1963, Pacific distributed stock rights representing the remaining 43 percent of Northwest shares.
Shareholders Gordon and Baan exercised their stock rights received
pursuant to the 1961 distribution, but did not then report any income as a
result of receiving the Northwest shares on the basis that the stock rights
3
distribution was tax-free under section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The Commissioner assessed deficiencies against both taxpayers arguing
that the Pacific distribution did not meet the nonrecognition requirements
of section 355. Both taxpayers petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the Commissioner's finding and, after consolidating the two actions,
the Tax Court held that the taxpayers could avail themselves of section 355
since that section did not preclude nonrecognition in a distribution involving stock rights rather than stock. 4 The Commissioner, taking advantage
of the taxpayers' diversity of citizenship, appealed the Tax Court's ruling
to the Courts of Appeal for the Second and Ninth Circuits. In Commissioner v. Gordon,5 the Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed as to
shareholder Gordon, holding that minor departures from the requirements
of section 355 were not fatal to the taxpayer's claim for nonrecognition
status under the Pacific stock rights distribution plan since the distribution
1. The transaction under consideration involves a spin-off as distinguished from
a split-off or split-up. In a spin-off the controlling corporation transfers some of its
assets to an existing or newly created corporation (the controlled corporation) in

exchange for the stock of the controlled corporation. This stock is then distributed
to the shareholders of the controlling corporation. The split-off is similar to a spin-off
except that in a split-off the shareholders must surrender some of their original
shares in the controlling corporation. The split-up involves a distribution to the
shareholders of the stock of two or more existing or newly created subsidiaries incident
to a complete liquidation of the distributing corporation. B. BITTKXR & J. EUSTICS,
FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 11.01, at 450-51

(2d ed. 1966).
2. For a complete description of the spin-off plan see Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71,
77-78 (1965).
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 355. For the complete language of the relevant
Code sections see note 19 infra.

4. Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71 (1965).
5. 382 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1967).
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had a valid business purpose and was free from a tax avoidance scheme. 6
In Commissioner v. Baan,7 however, the Ninth Circuit interpreted section
3"55 literally and held that Pacific's plan was not a distribution "with respect
to. stock" as required by section 355 but was rather a sale of stock for a
cash consideration and therefore clearly outside the scope of nonrecognition
treatment. 8 Additionally, this court rejected the taxpayer's argument that
the 1961 and 1963 distributions should be viewed as parts of a single
transaction and held that since there was a piecemeal distribution which
extended over a period of 2 years, the taxpayers could not invoke the
protection of section 355.9 On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Second Circuit and affirmed that of the Ninth Circuit,
holding that Pacific's failure to distribute control in Northwest in the
initial stock rights distribution together with its failure to absolutely
commit itself to distribute the remaining shares was sufficient to take the
transaction outside the scope of section 355. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391
U.S. 83 (1968).
; The tax-free spin-off was first permitted by Congress in the Revenue
Act of 192410 when it was recognized that this type of corporate reorganization was an "ordinary business [transaction which should] not be prevented on account of provisions of the tax law."" Unfortunately the tax
laws permitting such tax-free status were so loosely drafted that by utilizing various corporate reorganization schemes shareholders could avoid the
tax consequences of incurring dividend income and receive more favorable
capital gain treatment. 12 To counteract the many reorganization plans
designed to circumvent the 1924 Act, Congress in 1934 eliminated all
spin-off distributions from the protection of the tax laws.' 3 Distributions
of stock pursuant to spin-offs were not again given special tax-free treatment until 1951 when Congress, by amending the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939,14 again recognized the need for giving nonrecognition treatment
to transactions which were designed merely to allocate corporate capital
rather than to distribute income. 15 In this amendment Congress enunciated
6. Id. at 503-05.
7. 382 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967).
8. Id. at 493.
9. Id. at 496-97.
10. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 256.
11. H.R. RVP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1
(Part 2) CUM. BULL. 241, 251. Prior to this legislation a shareholder was accorded
nonrecognition treatment as a result of a corporate distribution of stock only if he
exchanged his stock in the controlling corporation for shares in the controlled corporation. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1060. Thus, this prior
legislation gave preferential treatment to split-offs and split-ups. See Rockefeller v.
U.S., 257 U.S. 176 (1921) ; U.S. v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
12. See, e.g., Evelyn F. Gregory, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), rev'd, Helvering v.
Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aft'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
13. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(c) (2), 48 Stat. 704. The recommendation of the House Committee on Ways and Means stated: "[C]orporations have
found it possible to pay what would otherwise be taxable dividends, without any
taxes upon their shareholders." H.R. RP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934),
reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) CuM. BULL. 554, 564.
14. INT. RiV. CODE of 1939, § 112(b) (11), added by 65 Stat. 493.
15. The Senate Committee on Finance reported that "[tihis section has been
included in the bill because your committee believes it is economically unsound to
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with somewhat greater specificity than in the 1924 Act the exact manner
in which a spin-off should be accomplished with concomitant tax immunity
to the corporate shareholders. These more specific guidelines together with
other strengthening modifications became section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.10
Section 355 allows corporate distributions of stock or securities 17 to
18
shareholders in connection with a spin-off, a split-up, or a split-off
to be
accorded nonrecognition treatment when four basic requirements are met :19
1. Solely stock or securities of the controlled corporation must be
distributed to shareholders of the controlling corporation in eximpede spin-offs which break-up business into a greater number of enterprises, when
undertaken for legitimate business purposes." S. RiP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 58
(1951), reprinted in 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 458, 499.

16. INT. REv. Cone of 1954, § 355. For a full discussion of the historical background of section 355 see Jacobs, Spin-offs: The Pre-Distribution Two Business
Rule - Edmund P. Coady and Beyond, 19 TAX L. Riv. 155, 155-62 (1964); Mette,
Spin-Off Reorganizations and the Revenue Act of 1951, 8 TAX L. R.v. 337 (1953).
17. Corporate distributions may consist of cash, property, debt or contractual
obligations, or stock. The stock distribution referred to in section 355 concerns a
distribution of stock in the controlled corporation by the controlling corporation to the
shareholders of the latter and is not to be confused with a stock dividend which is a
distribution of the corporation's own stock to its shareholders. See B. BITrKER
& J. EusrICE, supra note 1, §§ 5.20-.63.
18. See note 1 supra.
19. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 355 in pertinent part provides:
(a) EFFEcT ON DISTRIBUTEES.(1)

GENERAL RULE-If-

(A) a corporation (referred to in this section as the "distributing
corporation") (i) distributes to a shareholder, with respect to its stock, or
(ii) distributes to a security holder, in exchange for its securities, solely stock or securities of a corporation (referred to in this
section as "controlled corporation") which it controls immediately
before the distribution,
(B) the transaction was not used principally as a device for the
distribution of the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation or
the controlled corporation or both (but the mere fact that subsequent to
the distribution stock or securities in one or more of such corporations
are sold or exchanged by all or some of the distributees (other than pursuant to an arrangement negotiated or agreed upon prior to such distribution) shall not be construed to mean that the transaction was used
principally as such a device),
(C) the requirements of subsection (b) (relating to active businesses) are satisfied, and
(D) as part of the distribution, the distributing corporation distributes(i) all of the stock and securities in the controlled corporation
held by it immediately before the distribution, or
(ii) an amount of stock in the controlled corporation constituting control within the meaning of section 368(c), and it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate that the

retention by the distributing corporation of stock (or stock and

securities) in the controlled corporation was not in pursuance of a
plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal
income tax,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to (and no amount shall be includible
in the income of) such shareholder or security holder on the receipt of such
stock or securities.
(b)

REQUIREMENTS AS To AcTive BUSINESS.-

(1)

GNERAL.-Subsection (a) shall apply only if either(A) the distributing corporation, and the controlled corporation (or,
if stock of more than one controlled corporation is distributed, each of
IN
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change for their securities or with respect to the amount of their
stock in the controlling corporation ;20
2. The distribution must not be a device designed to avoid the imposition of income tax liability ;21
3. Both the distributing and the controlled corporation must be engaged in the active conduct of business immediately after the distribution and the newly formed business must not have been
acquired within 5 years of the date of distribution in a transaction
in which gain or loss is recognized ;22 and
4. The distributing corporation must distribute all the stock or securities in the controlled corporation which it held immediately before
the distribution or, in the alternative, at least 80 percent of that
stock, provided it can be shown that the stock retained was not in
2

pursuance of a tax avoidance plan. 3

The facts of the instant case give rise to three distinct problems in the
construction of section 355 - first, whether the distribution of Northwest
stock pursuant to the exercise of stock rights and payment of a cash consideration was a distribution with respect to stock within subsection
355(a) (1) (A) (i); second, since Pacific recognized gain in acquiring the
newly created corporation as a result of receiving the $200 million demand
note from Northwest, whether the active business requirements of subsection 355 (b) (2) (C) had been met; and third, whether such a corporate
such corporations), is engaged immediately after the distribution in the
active conduct of a trade or business, or
(B) immediately before the distribution, the distributing corporation
had no assets other than stock or securities in the controlled corporations
and each of the controlled corporations is engaged immediately after the
distribution in the active conduct of a trade or business.

(2) DnFINITION.-For purposes of paragraph (1), a corporation shall be
treated as engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business if and
only if(A) it is engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business, or
substantially all of its assets consist of stock and securities of a corporation controlled by it (immediately after the distribution) which is so
engaged,
(B) such trade or business has been actively conducted throughout
the 5-year period ending on the date of the distribution,
(C) such trade or business was not acquired within the period described in subparagraph (B) in a transaction in which gain or loss was
recognized in whole or in part, and
(D) control of a corporation which (at the time of acquisition of
control) was conducting such trade or business(i) was not acquired directly (or through one or more corporations) by another corporation within the period described in subparagraph (B), or
(ii) was so acquired by another corporation within such period,
but such control was so acquired only by reason of transactions in
which gain or loss was not recognized in whole or in part, or only
by reason of such transactions combined with acquisitions before the
beginning of such period.
20. INT. Rzv. CoDi of 1954, § 355(a) (1) (A).
21. INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 355(a)
(1) (B).
22. INT. Rev. CoDI of 1954, §§ 35 5(a) (1) (C), 355(b) (2) (C). Section 355 contains three additional active business requirements none of which, however, are pertinent
to the facts of the instant case.
23. INT. IV. CoDe of 1954, §§ 355(a) (1) (D), 368(c).
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distribution of stock could be accomplished over a 2-year period rather than
only in an immediate transfer. Unfortunately the Supreme Court did not
resolve all the questions presented but confined itself to resolving only the
2-year distribution issue.
The distribution issue facing the Court was whether subsection 355
(a) (1) (D) permits separate successive distributions of 57 percent and
43 percent of the stock of the controlled corporation over a 2-year period
or whether that subsection requires a complete and immediate single distribution. This Code provision mandates a complete or at minimum 80
percent divestiture of the stock which the controlling corporation acquired
in the controlled corporation immediately before distribution. In resolving
this issue, the Second Circuit stated that there was "nothing on the face
of this subsection that relates to the number of transactions ...which may
be contained in a distribution. '2 4 The court further reasoned that the
"device" language of subsection 355 (a) (1) (B) was more than adequate
to cover multi-distribution schemes which might be designed to avoid
taxes and that since the Pacific distribution was not such a tax avoidance
device, nonrecognition was proper.25 The Ninth Circuit took a contrary
position, however, based on a more literal construction of the statute. The
court stated:
[S]ection 355 requires that there be a single transaction in which a
controlling interest is transferred and that for two or more distributions to be entitled to treatment as a single transaction transferring
control of the controlled corporation to the shareholders of the distributing corporation, such distributions must not extend over any
greater period of time than is reasonably necessary considering the
practical problems involved in completing such distributions . *...26
The Supreme Court took a middle course between the conflicting
circuit court positions and reasoned that since Pacific had no definite commitment to divest itself of the remaining shares after the initial distribution
27
of 57 percent, it had not met the requirement of distributing control.
The Court was concerned that the future tax consequences of the initial 57
percent distribution in 1961 were undeterminable since under section 355
there is no nonrecognition treatment until control, i.e., 80 percent, is distributed. Such distribution of control did not occur in the instant case
until 1963 when Pacific divested itself of the remaining 43 percent, which
distribution it was not contractually bound to make. The Supreme Court
specifically withheld an opinion as to the tax impact if Pacific had been
contractually committed to make the 1963 distributions ;28 however, the
24. 382 F.2d at 508.
25. Id. For a similar analysis in agreement with the Second Circuit's position
see Note, Variations on the Spin-Off As Non-Taxable Distributions, 67 COLUM. L.
Rsv. 1544 (1967) and 81 HARV. L. Rxv. 482 (1967).
26. 382 F.2d at 498 (emphasis added). See also 56 CALIF. L. Rev. 220 (1968).
27. 391 U.S. at 96. Control is defined in INT. REv. CoDn of 1954, § 368(c) as stock

possessing 80 percent of the voting power of all classes of stock or 80 percent of
the total number of shares of all other classes of stock.
391 U.S.University
at 96-97 Charles
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Court did indicate in dictum tral before one transaction can be characterized as a first step in a distribution plan, there must be a binding commitment to take the later steps. 29
The rationale employed by the Court, though in accord with judicial
precedent,80 is subject to question insofar as it applies to section 355 distributions. Although a clear indication of congressional intent in the
enactment of section 355 concerning multi-step distribution plans is lacking,
a close reading of the statutory language indicates that even if the distributing corporation bound itself by contract to complete such a plan, this
might not be sufficient to meet the particularity of section 3 5 5's requirements. The specific language employed in the section seemingly precludes
such a distribution. Subsections 355(a) (1) (A) and (a) (1) (D) are both
premised on the requirement that the distributing corporation have control
of the spun-off corporation immediately before the distribution. In the
instant case, Pacific's 1963 distribution of stock rights to the remaining 43
percent of Northwest's stock cannot be said to fit the meaning of these
subsections unless the words "immediately before" can be construed to
relate to the date of the binding commitment and the distribution itself be
considered to have taken place on that date. It is particularly significant to
note that subsection 355(b) (2) (B) contemplates a designated date of
distribution which will be the point of departure for the Commissioner to
determine whether the section's active business requirements have been
met. Assuming that Pacific had made a binding commitment to distribute
all of its stock in 1961, to decide that 1961 was the date of distribution
would be to decide that Pacific had in effect distributed control of Northwest in 1961 although it still retained 43 percent of Northwest's stock until
1963 - a period of 2 years. A further indication that Congress contemplated a complete and immediate divestiture was its concern that any
retention of stock by the distributing corporation might encourage plans
designed to avoid income tax liability. 31 To permit some proper corporate
flexibility Congress did enact subsection 355 (a) (1) (D) (ii) which allowed
retention of up to 20 percent of the stock; however, this is permitted only
on condition that the distributing corporation explain to the Commissioner
the reasons for such retention. By making an initial distribution and a
commitment to distribute any remaining stock within 5 years, for example,
a distributing corporation could easily circumvent this provision. In such
a circumstance although the distributing corporation would be required to
distribute the remaining stock within 5 years it could retain rather than
divest itself of control during the interim period between the initial and
final steps of the transaction. Thus, in the wording of these subsections, it
appears that only one specific and certain distribution date was contemplated throughout section 355.
29. 391 U.S. at 96.
30. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Schumacker Wall Board Corp., 93 F.2d 79 (9th
Cir. 1937). For a commentary on this approach see Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions
in Corporate Reorganizations, N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAX 247 (1954).
31. See INT. RAv. CODE of 1954, § 355(a) (1)(D) (ii).
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As previously indicated the Supreme Court decided only the issue of
whether section 355 permitted a distribution to take part in two distinct
steps and left unanswered important questions on which the Second and
Ninth Circuits took disparate positions. These questions will ultimately
face the courts again and their resolution will be vital to the planning of
future corporate reorganizations. The remainder of this Note will focus
on these unanswered issues.
The initial unresolved question concerns the requirement of subsection
355 (a) (1) (A) that the stock of the spun-off corporation be distributed
with respect to the stock of the distributing corporation. The Commissioner
argued in both circuit courts that Pacific's distribution of stock rights
exercisable upon payment of $16 was not such a distribution of stock, but
was more in the nature of a sale of stock for a cash consideration. The
Second Circuit in Gordon rejected this argument and decided that the
phrase "distributes . . . with respect to its stock" did not preclude a dis32
tribution by a corporation with respect to its stock plus a consideration.
In so deciding the Second Circuit ignored the fact that the distribution was
of stock rights and showed no concern for whether stock rights could be
considered within the term "stock." The court stated: "[I]t is the actual
distribution of the Northwest stock upon the exercise of the rights that
is the relevant event and the use of the stock rights as a mere mechanism
to accomplish this result should be disregarded. '3 The Ninth Circuit in
Baan, on the other hand, decided that the phrase "distributes . . . with
respect to its stock" was used consistently throughout the Internal Revenue
Code as a term of art and therefore should be accorded the literal meaning
which Congress intended. The court, in recognizing that stock rights were
not included within the term stock, characterized the Pacific distribution
as a sale of stock rights and concluded that the Code language, since it
makes no mention of consideration, precluded a sale for a cash consideration. It held, therefore, that the transaction was outside the intended
scope of section 355.34

The Ninth Circuit's literal approach to the stock-stock rights issue
appears to be the correct interpretation of section 355 and, reasoning along
these lines, the finding of a sale of rights is a proper result. With respect
to the Second Circuit's decision to ignore the fact that stock rights rather
than stock was distributed, it is important to note that the court characterized the Pacific distribution plan as essentially a step transaction a judicial method of applying substance rather than form to the income tax
laws. This method was first expressed in Bassick v. Commissioner,3 5 where
the Second Circuit stated that "[f]or income tax purposes, the component
32. 382 F.2d at 505.
33. Id. For analysis in accord with the position taken by the Second Circuit see
Note, Variations on the Spin-Off As Non-Taxable Distributions, 67 COLUM. L. Riv.

1544 (1967), 56 CALIF. L. R~v. 220 (1968), 81 HARV. L. REv. 482 (1967), and
43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 389 (1968).
34. 382 F.2d at 495.
35. 85 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 592 (1936).
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steps of a single transaction cannot be treated separately." 36 Following
this approach, the lower court in Gordon considered a distribution of stock
rights to be merely a step leading to the distribution of stock and considered this initial step to be a nonseparable aspect of the whole stock
distribution plan. The court premised its approach on the Supreme Court's
opinion in Palmer v. Commissioner,3 7 and interpreted Palmer as holding
that the issuance of stock rights may be disregarded for tax purposes and
therefore tax consequences flow not from the issuance of the rights but
rather from their exercise.38 The Second Circuit therefore concluded that
the relevant event for tax purposes was the distribution of the stock upon
exercise of the stock rights and not upon their issuance.3 9 This conclusion
and interpretation of Palmer is questionable in light of a footnote in the
instant case wherein the Supreme Court specifically noted that it "has
not . . .been authoritatively settled whether an issue of rights to purchase

at less than fair market value itself constitutes a dividend, or [whether]
the dividend occurs only on the actual purchase. ' 40 Should it be decided
by the Supreme Court in a future case that a dividend occurs ol issuance, 41
then the step transaction approach, which disregards the issuance of stock
rights as having a separate tax significance, would lose some of its force
since the issuance of stock rights apparently could not then be disregarded.
Further support for the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the distribution
of stock rights in itself is not an adequate substitute for the distribution
of stock and therefore outside the scope of section 355 is found in the
analogous area of corporate reorganizations. In this area the Supreme
Court has determined that where it is required that stock be issued, the
42
issuance of stock rights will not be sufficient to meet that requirement.
Furthermore, in passing the predecessor to subsection 355(a) (1) (A) in
1951, Congress itself stated that the section applies "where only stock ...
36. 85 F.2d at 10. Accord, Prairee Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, 66 F.2d 309 (10th
Cir. 1933) ; Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943). In Heller the court said: "In
determining the substance of a transaction it is proper to consider the situation as it
existed at the beginning and end of the series of steps ... and the relation between the
various steps." Id. at 383.
37. 302 U.S. 63 (1937).
38. 382 F.2d at 505.

39. Id.

40. 391 U.S. at 89 n.4. This statement apparently was inserted by the Court
because the Palmer decision has been too broadly interpreted by the lower courts.
Indicative of this fact was the Tax Court's definitive statement relying on the Palmer
rationale, that the issuance of the rights could not be considered as a dividend. The
Tax Court by this statement rejected the Commissioner's contention that the rights
rather than the stock were the subject of the distribution. Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71,
91 (1965).
41. A number of commentators adopt the viewpoint that the issuance of a right
represents more than a mere offer for sale, and point to provisions of the 1954 Code
which indicate that rights are property and therefore the issuance of a right is actually
a distribution of a property-dividend. Carlson, Taxation of "Taxable" Stock Rights:
The Strange Persistence of Palmer v. Commissioner, 23 TAx L. Rgv. 129 (1968);
Whiteside, Income Tax Consequences of Distributions of Stock Rights to Shareholders, 66 YALt L.J. 1016 (1957).

42. Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 200-02, rehearing denied,
315 U.S. 829 (1942). Although the instant transaction is not a corporate reorganization as defined in section 368, it closely parallels a "D" reorganization. See INT. REv.
CODF of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (D).
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is distributed by the corporation or corporations. ' '43 Moreover, in other
sections of the Code where it was adjudged to be necessary, Congress
expressly included stock rights within the ambit of the term stock. 4 4 In

comparing these sections with section 355 it appears logical to conclude
that had Congress deemed it desirable or necessary stock rights and stock
would have been given similar treatment under section 355.45
Although stock rights do not appear to be included within the purview
of the term stock under subsection 355 (a) (1) (A), the implications of a
simple stock rights distribution without consideration at first blush appear
no different from those of a distribution of the stock itself. Absent the
requirement that a large amount of cash be expended in order to exercise
the rights, a shareholder could simply exchange his stock rights for stock
and be in the same position as if stock had been distributed to him in the
initial offering. The Pacific distribution plan creates an additional problem,
however, because it required each stockholder to tender $16 as well as six
stock rights in order to receive one share of Northwest stock. Thus, the
distribution was not exclusively with respect to stock as is specifically
required by section 355, but was with respect to stock plus a consideration.
This spin-off thus was not a spin-off in the classic sense in which stock is
merely distributed, but in addition served as a capital-raising venture
for the corporation.
The Second Circuit, in answering the Commissioner's contention that
the distribution was actually a sale for a cash consideration, separated the
component parts of the transaction and stated that the distribution was
"with respect to stock," but in addition thereto the shareholders had contributed capital to the corporation. 40 If this transaction were not so separated, it justifiably could be termed a sale and clearly would not have met
the requirements of section 355. The effect of the Second Circuit's characterization of this transaction as a distribution of property together with
a separate capital contribution would be to give Pacific an unjustifiable
tax windfall since a corporation neither recognizes gain on a distribution
of property to its shareholders with respect to stock4 7 nor realizes any
income from a contribution to its capital. 48 However, if the transaction
were characterized as a sale of property, Pacific would be required to recognize gain to the extent that the price paid for the property exceeded its
cost basis. In the instant case Pacific did in fact report such recognizable
43. S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 Cum.
BULL. 458, 499 (emphasis added).
44. See, e.g., INT. Rev. COD of 1954, §§ 305, 306(d).
45. The Ninth Circuit's position is further enhanced since the Treasury Regulations provide that: "[flor the purpose of section 355, stock rights or stock warrants
are not included in the term 'stock and securities'." Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (1955). For
a discussion on the weight to be accorded Treasury Regulations see Griswold, A
Summntary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. Rev. 398 (1941). Additionally,
the Pacific distribution plan was effected in the face of an adverse private ruling by
the Commissioner as to the plan's tax consequences with respect to the Pacific stock-

holders. See Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 85-86 (1965).
46. 382 F.2d at 505.
47. INT. Rev. COD of 1954, § 311.
48. INT. Rev. CoDe of 1954, § 118.
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gain from the sale of stock rights in its 1961 tax return. 49 If the transaction
is characterized as a sale of property as it relates to the distributing corporation, it seems illogical to characterize that same transaction as a capital
contribution and not a sale as it relates to the taxpayer.
It also is important to note that the Code phrase "distributes ... with

respect to its stock" appears to be a term of art used with consistency
throughout the Code" ° to refer to distributions without cash consideration,
not to sales. 51 Since payment of cash in addition to the stock rights was
necessary to the Pacific distribution plan, this transaction would seem to
fall outside the meaning of this phrase.
In addition, the requirement of the Pacific distribution that a cash
consideration be paid in order to obtain Northwest stock impliedly contravenes the doctrine of continuity of interest which requires that the original
owners of the controlling corporation retain a continuing interest in the
spun-off corporation. 52 Such a requirement may have the effect of restricting section 355's availability to the stockholders of the controlling corporation. 53 That this continuity may be hampered is not merely a theoretical
argument since it is not unreasonable to assume that some of the Pacific
shareholders may have lacked the requisite cash to exercise their stock
rights and preserve their interests. 54 The Second Circuit answered this
49. Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 83 (1965). It should be noted that even if
Pacific had not properly reported this income as required by section 351 (b), the fact

that the gain was recognizable would still lead to the conclusion that this transaction
was a sale.
50. See, e.g., INT. Rev. CODP of 1954, § 301 (distributions of property); § 305
(distributions of stock and stock rights); § 307 (basis of stock and stock rights
acquired in distributions) ; § 311 (taxability of corporation on distributions) ; and
§ 312 (effect of distribution on corporate earnings and profits).
51. Thus, INT. RmV. Coos of 1954, § 311(a) specifically provides that a corporation shall not recognize gain or loss on a distribution ("with respect to its stock")
of its stock or property. Therefore a distribution with respect to stock could not
include a sale of property since on a sale the corporation would be required to recognize gain to the extent the purchase price was greater than the basis of the property.
INT. Rgv. CODS of 1954, §§ 1001, 1002. Additionally, INT. Riv. CODZ of 1954, §
355 (a) (2) (B) provides that the distributing corporation may receive stock back
from the shareholder but no provision is made for the receipt of cash by the distributing corporation. Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 489 (1967).
52. The continuity of interest requirement that was apparently incorporated into
section 355 by Congress was originally a judicially imposed doctrine. LeTulle v.
Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner,
287 U.S. 462 (1933). Its purpose is to deny tax-free status to transactions which
have the appearance of a sale. See B. BITTKISR & J. EuSTIC8, supra note 1, §§ 11.09,
12.11. For a criticism of this doctrine see Griswold, "Securties" and "Continuity of
Interest", 58 HARV. L. Rlv. 705 (1945).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) (1955). This point was aptly made in Petitioner's
Brief:
The fundamental basis for non-recognition of gain or loss under Section 355
(and the standard reorganization sections) is that no tax should be imposed
when the same people continue to own the same businesses with only formal
changes in business organization.
Brief for Petitioner at 24, Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967).
54. Although 95 percent of the Pacific stockholders exercised their stock rights in
Northwest, the dominant shareholder of Pacific, A.T.&T., comprised 89 percent of this
group. Thus, of the shareholders who owned the remaining 11 percent of Pacific, only
6 percent, a little more than half of the minority, exercised rather than sold their rights.
In a situation, where a great block of shares is not owned by any one shareholder, it
can be assumed that this same lack of continuity of ownership would occur.
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argument by applying a retrospective test and observed that a continuity
of ownership by Pacific shareholders was in fact maintained, " , whereas
the Ninth Circuit indicated that a prospective test was appropriate since
at the time of the initial distribution it remained uncertain whether continuity would be preserved in the future.56 In evaluating the two approaches, it would seem that the prospective test is to be preferred because
it has the advantage of allowing the shareholder-taxpayer to structure his
financial affairs in light of predictable tax consequences. Under the retrospective test the shareholder-taxpayer would be placed in the position of
guessing whether a distribution will or will not qualify under section 355,
and thereby be subject to a possible tax liability not originally contemplated.
The second question left unanswered both by the Supreme Court and
the Ninth Circuit involves the application of the active business requirement of subsection 355(b) (2) (C). Under this subsection if a trade or
business is acquired within 5 years of the date of a stock distribution in a
transaction in which gain or loss is recognized the distribution will not be
accorded nonrecognition treatment. Since Pacific received "boot ' 57 in the
form of a $200 million demand note from Northwest which would be a
recognizable gain 58 under section 351, the Commissioner contended in both
Baan and Gordon that the Pacific distribution did not satisfy the active
business requirements. Notwithstanding the fact that Pacific received a
recognizable gain, the Second Circuit concluded that the Pacific distribution
of Northwest stock was still within the protection of section 355.59 The
court interpreted subsection 355(b) (2) (C) to mean that gain or loss is
only relevant when new assets are brought into the distributing corporation's structure6 ° and that the subsection was not applicable if existing
assets were merely transferred to the newly created corporation. Under
this analysis, the court would implicitly apply this subsection only to the
acquisition of new assets from third parties. Such an interpretation is not
without merit since the enactment of subsection 355 (b) (2) (C) was "apparently intended to prevent temporary purchases of going businesses [from
61
third parties] as a method of distributing liquid assets to shareholders."
55. 382 F.2d at 506.

56. 382 F.2d at 495.
57. Boot is generally considered to be money or "other" property which is considered recognition-type property, as opposed to stock or securities which receive
nonrecognition treatment under the reorganization sections of the Internal Revenue
Code. For a discussion of the nature of boot see 3 J. MERTENS, LAW or FD -RAL
INcOME TAXATION § 20.147 (Zimet & Weiss rev. 1965).
58. Section 351 states that no gain or loss will be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation solely in exchange for stock and securities of such corporations
and immediately after such exchange the transferors control the corporation. INT.
RZv. CODS of 1954, § 351. The demand note received by Pacific would not be considered within the term stock or securities and Pacific would therefore be required
to recognize gain. Pinellas Ice & Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
59. 382 F.2d at 507.
60. Id. Actually Pacific received more than $500,000 in new assets when the rights
were exercised; therefore the court's analysis can be questioned.
61. Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, The Internal Revenue Code
of 1954: Corporation Distributions, Organizations, And Re-Organizations, 68 HARv.
L. Rev. 393, 430 (1955).
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The correct interpretation of this subsection, however, remains uncertain
since the Tax Court has pointed out that nowhere in the committee reports
2
is the reason behind the enactment of 355(b) (2) (C) officially stated.0
Moreover, if this subsection were enacted only as a means to prevent such
temporary purchases, the "device" language of subsection 355 (a) (1) (B)
would seemingly have accomplished that goal. According to subsection
355(a) (1) (B), if a transaction is a device to distribute earnings and
profits of the distributing corporation, the distribution will not be protected by section 355. Thus, a purchase and subsequent liquidation of the
purchased business will be considered a device to convert what normally
would be ordinary income into a capital gain and if such a device is
used, the shareholders of the purchasing corporation would not be accorded
section 355 nonrecognition treatment. Since a distribution must meet both
the device and active business requirements of section 355, unduly limiting
the active business test to preclude only that which is already prevented by
the device test would serve to reduce the active business requirement to
a mere redundancy.
The suggestion has been made by several commentators that subsection 355(b)(2)(C) be reworded by Congress to avoid misinterpretation
since in its present form it has not effectively obviated the evils which it
was designed to eliminate while at the same time has encompassed transactions not meant to be within its scope.68 Indicative of such an overextension of the prophylactic language of subsection 355(b)(2)(C) is the
situation where corporation B, a subsidiary of corporation A, purchases
another business at a price which equals the adjusted basis of the newly
acquired business. In this type of corporate transaction, no gain or loss is
recognized on the corporate level64 and that fact would seem to keep the
transaction outside the literal language of subsection 355(b)(2)(C).
Therefore, upon a subsequent spin-off of corporation B's stock to the
shareholders of corporation A, nonrecognition would not be denied due
to corporation A's failure to meet the literal language of subsection
355(b) (2) (C) - "in which gain or loss was recognized." If this stock
is subsequently sold by corporation A's shareholders, any gain realized by
them would .thus be considered as capital gain. It seems inappropriate to
permit nonrecognition in this circumstance since this is the kind of transaction at which this subsection was specifically directed because of the
danger that ordinary income will be converted into capital gain. Conversely,
in a corporate transaction not designed to avoid the tax laws, the receipt
of any boot on the corporate level, no matter how minimal, could result
in the disqualification of the transaction from nonrecognition treatment as
62. W.E. Gabriel Fabrication Co., 42 T.C. 545, 557 (1964).
63. Chodorow, Recent Developments in Divisive Reorganizations under Section
355, U. So. CAL. 1967 TAX INST. 183, 201-02; Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau &
Warren, supra note 61, at 430 & n.285 (1955); Jacobs, The Anatomy of a Spin-off,
1967 DuKE L.J. 1, 18-21.
64. See INT. RJEV. CoDE of 1954, § 1001. But see BITTKXR & EusTIcn, supra note 1,
at 470, where it is suggested that the Court would interpret, the term recognized to be
recognized or recognizable.
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if the new business had been acquired entirely for cash.6 5 If Congress
wishes to correct the weaknesses in this statute it should concern itself
less with the form of the transaction (the recognition of gain or loss) and
more with the substance or nature of the transaction (the possible conversion of ordinary income into capital gain).
In final analysis, the dichotomy that exists between the Second and
Ninth Circuit opinions reduces itself to whether section 355 should be
interpreted literally or interpreted in light of supposed congressional intent.
The individual taxpayer is invoking the protection of this section; it is
therefore his responsibility to insure that his actions strictly follow the
applicable Code requirements. Nonrecognition in this area of corporate
endeavor is not granted as a matter of right but rather as a privilege which
Congress has conferred upon certain transactions and certain taxpayers.
As the Supreme Court has previously noted: "It has been said many times
that provisions granting special tax exemptions are to be strictly construed.
Measured by this sound standard, it is probably not necessary to go beyond
the plain words of . . . [the pertinent tax statute] in search of the
legislative meaning." 6 In the instant case the Pacific reorganization
in all likelihood was not used as a device to avoid federal income taxes;
however, Pacific's failure to adhere to the rigid requirements of section 355
defeated the tax-free nature of this distribution.
It has been suggested that "[t]he purpose of laying down precise and
detailed requirements [in section 355] was to attempt to achieve an objective standard for judging the qualification or nonqualification of corporate
separations for tax free treatment. '6 7 In applying such objective standards
it is significant to note that the instant transaction involved a publicly held
corporation. While the precise restrictions of section 355 apply to all corporations, it appears that they are directed primarily at the closely held corporation because in such a corporate entity a small number of shareholders
partake in the accumulated profits and these shareholders could easily cause
a spin-off to be utilized as a device to avoid income taxes.8 8 As a solution
Congress could either relax the rigid requirements of section 355 for all
corporations and employ only the device language of subsection 355(a) (1)
(B) to protect against a distribution of earnings masquerading as a capital
allocation, 9 or make the restrictions which apply to publicly held corpora65. See notes 40 and 41 supra.
66. Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, 311 U.S. 46, 49 (1940). Accord,
Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1939) ; White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281,
292 (1938) ; New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1933).
67. Lyons, Some Problems in Corporate Separation Under The 1954 Code, 12
TAx L. Rtv. 15, 19 (1956).
68. See generally Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, A Technical Revision
of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders,
52 COLUM. L. Rsv. 1, 43-45 (1952). The authors suggest that the widely held corporation could be treated differently under the reorganization sections than the closely
held corporation.
69. Palestin, Tests for Tax-Free Distributions on Corporate Division, 38 TAXPS
327 (1960).
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tions70 more flexible than they are at present. If the latter approach is taken
the active business and complete divestiture requirements should be redefined
in terms of the substance rather than the form of the transaction in order
to allow a corporation which has a valid business purpose to reallocate
its resources without having to face the danger that such a reallocation will
be treated as a dividend to its shareholders. It is submitted that the instant
case was correctly decided on the narrow issue which the Supreme Court
resolved even though the Pacific spin-off transaction probably was not a
device designed to distribute earnings. It is further suggested that should
another court be confronted with the issues raised in the instant case, the
sound analysis employed by the Ninth Circuit should be followed in
reaching their proper adjudication.
David H. Belkin
70. Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, supra note 68, at 43 & n.87. The authors
provide a formula for those corporations which can be considered widely held as
opposed to closely held.
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